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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines the relationships of solidarity that developed between the 
Mozambican people and the Zimbabwean liberation movement ZANU, between 1975 and 
1980, considering them in their multifarious aspects and attempting to understand the dynamics 
at work. Scholars have not paid sufficient attention to Mozambique’s role as the host country of 
the Zimbabwean liberation movement. This dissertation is intended to fill this gap in the 
literature, by engaging critically with the history of ZANU-Mozambique relations, seen from 
the perspective of the Mozambicans themselves. My argument is that Mozambican support to 
ZANU was marked by a spirit of mutual cooperation and brotherhood between people who 
shared a similar historical and cultural background, which is a major factor behind the support 
offered by Mozambican people to ZANU. But, this solidarity was also the consequence of an 
authoritarian effort by the Mozambican ruling party, FRELIMO. to impose a specific political 
and ideological consciousness. This consciousness was shaped through the creation of legal 
instruments to ensure popular support such as the creation of the Solidarity Bank in 1976; by 
the use of an authoritarian discourse which relied on a ‘vocabulary of ready-made ideas’1; and 
by the use of such methods as the cartoon figure, Xiconhoca, stigmatising all those who did not 
support solidarity with ZANU as traitors or sell-outs. 
 
Keywords: Solidarity, nationalism, Liberation struggle, ideology, Frelimo, ZANU, Xiconhoca 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Maria-Benedita Bastos. ‘The Writing of National Anthem in Post-Independence Mozambique: Fictions of 
Subject People.’Kronos, 39, 1, (Nov 2013) 
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Introduction 
The idea of studying the relationship between liberation movements in Southern Africa and 
Mozambican people, both leaders and commoners, emerged in the context of the xenophobic 
attacks against African migrants in South Africa that started in 2008. I remember hearing 
several Mozambicans showing their disappointment about these attacks. In their opinion, it 
was unfair to have such kind of brutality against African migrants, particularly Mozambican 
ones, since Mozambican people suffered and even died to support Zimbabwe and South 
African liberation movements soon after Independence. Then I began to be curious about the 
ways in which Mozambicans had supported the Zimbabwean liberation struggle as well as 
the ANC militants exiled in Maputo.  
This project grew at the Centro de Pesquisa de História Luta de Liberatção Nacional 
(Centre for Research of the History of Liberation Struggle) where I have been working as 
Assistant Researcher since 2012. By 2013-2014, I began to initiate preliminary archival 
research and interviews in Maputo and Matola. In October 2015, I took the money that I had 
been saving and I did the craziest trip of my life to Mapai district, where one of four brigades 
created by the Frelimo government in order to supported the ZANLA military operations 
were stationed. Crazy, because I was driving a small car; me and my assistant researcher, 
Fernando Machava, travelled almost 500 km from Maputo to the Mapai, from which around 
254 km of the trip (from Aldeia da Barragem, near Chókwe district to Mapai) was made in a 
bad road conditions, full of sand, holes and pebbles, only suitable to 4x4 cars. As result, the 
section of the road that usually takes 4 hours in a good car, took us almost 10 hours.  
I spent two weeks in Mapai doing interviews with militants who fought alongside 
Zimbabwean soldiers; going through the places where Mozambicans and Zimbabwean 
soldiers used to get to Zimbabwe; visiting graves where soldiers killed as the result of the 
combats were buried; going through the scrubs of their military quarters and bases; as well as 
interviewing ordinary people who had interacted with ZANLA soldiers. 
Most of my interviewees showed some enthusiasm and pleasure for finally having an 
opportunity to share their stories and experiences, in a country where the framework of 
reference is the ‘epic history’ that usually has space only for the voices of those who fought 
against the Portuguese colonialism. I remember one of my interviewees telling me that ‘our 
suffering on the side of the Zimbabweans did not matter to this country’. I also learned that in 
a society where the protagonists of the stories are usually men, the women at the back had 
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more to say and share, adding details, correcting dates and telling the story with other angles 
of view.  
This dissertation is product of all these places and experiences. It explores the 
network alliances and relationship between Mozambicans and Zimbabweans between 1975 
and 1980. Moved by the principle of solidarity and following the independence of 
Mozambique in 1975, the Mozambican Liberation Front (Frente de Libertação de 
Moçambique, Frelimo) supported the Zimbabwe National Union (ZANU) as well as the 
African National Congress (ANC), from Zimbabwe and South Africa respectively. Frelimo 
considered this support was a necessary step for the complete liberation of Mozambique.  
This thesis focuses on the solidarity relationship developed between Mozambican 
people and ZANU, considering it in its multiple aspects and attempting to understand its 
dynamics. It examines the Mozambican process of supporting the Zimbabwean liberation 
struggle from two angles. On one hand, it considers the support that was established in the 
rural areas, where people interacted closely with the ZANLA soldiers, providing food, 
intelligence on the movements of Rhodesian forces, and helping to transport war materials to 
the Rhodesian border. That was facilitated by historical and family ties between 
Zimbabweans and Mozambicans. On the other hand, it considers the support that was 
manifested in urban areas, where people demonstrated it through cultural manifestations such 
as letter, songs and poetry. 
It also analyses the influence of Frelimo’s revolutionary ideology and its political 
propaganda by exploring the role played by the cartoon figure of Xiconhoca, which was 
created the party-state as an instrument to bolster the support to Zimbabwe liberation 
movement and its struggle.  
As I wrote in an article published in 20172, some authors had explored the 
relationship between Mozambique and Zimbabwean liberation movements. Ngwabi Bhebe, 
David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, Zvakanyorwa Sadomba, Agrippah Mutambara, Fay 
Chung, Edgar Tekere and Wilfred Mhanda all, in varying degrees, refer to the political and 
military relationship between FRELIMO and ZANU during this period.3 These authors, on 
                                                          
2 See, C. Munguambe, ‘Nationalism and Exile in an Age of Solidarity: FRELIMO-ZANU relation in 
Mozambique (1975-1980)’, Journal of Southern Africa Studies,  43, 1, (Jan 2017) 
3 W. Mhanda, Dzino. Memories of a Freedom Fighter (Harare, Weaver Press, 2011); D. Martin and P. Johnson, 
The Struggle for Zimbabwe (Harare, African Publishing Group, 2012); F. Chung, Re-living the Second 
Chimurenga. Memories from Zimbabwe’s Liberation Struggle (Harare, Weaver Press, 2007); N. Bhebe, The 
ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe (Gweru, Mambo Press, 
1999); E. Tekere, A Lifetime of Struggle (Harare, SAPES Book, 2006); ZW. Sadomba, War Veterans in 
Zimbabwe’s Revolution. Challenging Neo-Colonialism and Settler and International Capital (London, James 
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the whole, cast the FRELIMO-ZANU relationship between 1975 to 1980 in a good light, with 
FRELIMO credited for having aided ZANU’s struggle in a more committed manner than did 
Zambia - ZANU’s initial primary host in exile. The principal exception to this overall thrust 
is Mhanda’s (nom de guerre: Dzinashe Machingura) autobiography. Mhanda presents a more 
complicated account of the relationship. He extols FRELIMO’s resuscitation of the armed 
struggle through its formation and hosting of the Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA) in 1975, 
he conveys regret for disregarding FRELIMO’s opposition in 1975 and 1976 to the ZIPA 
military leaders’ association with the leadership of Robert Mugabe, and he also expresses 
bitterness and resentment towards FRELIMO for the role it played in ZIPA’s liquidation in 
1977 and his subsequent incarceration by FRELIMO until 1980. A critical shortcoming in the 
aforementioned works is that they do not make the accounts of FRELIMO and ordinary 
Mozambicans who played a part in hosting ZANU, central to their analyses. Added to this is 
that Mozambican scholars have not paid attention to the FRELIMO-ZANU relationship. The 
autobiographical accounts of FRELIMO elites such as José Moiane and Lopes Tembe who 
interacted with ZANU in the period concerned, also do not discuss in great detail FRELIMO-
ZANU relations.4 This is because, as Amélia Neves De Souto explains, the writing of 
‘personal memoirs is a completely new phenomenon in Mozambique. Some are simple 
accounts, with no objectives or aims other than telling the story of what the author believes 
was important in his or her life’s journey’.5The other aspect is that these biographies fits in 
‘Collective Memories frame’6, which present a history of the facts carefully coordinate, 
composed by a single and homogenous narrative, at the same time that they are silent about 
all the mistakes and gaps in the history.7This dissertation begins to address these 
shortcomings in the literature by foregrounding the perspectives of Mozambican elites and 
ordinary people on the FRELIMO-ZANU relationship. 
 
. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Currey, 2011); A. Mutambara, The Rebel in Me: A ZANLA Guerrilla Commander in the Rhodesian Bush War, 
1974-1980 (Pinetown, 30 Degrees South Publishers, 2014).  
4
 See JP. Moiane, Memórias de Um Guerrilheiro na Frente de Combate (Maputo, King Ngungunhane Institute, 
2009). L.T. Ndelana, Da Udenamo à Frelimo e à Diplomacia Moçambicana (Maputo, Marambique, 2012) 
5
 AN. Souto, ‘Memory and Identity in the History of Frelimo: Some Research Themes’, Kronos, 39, 1, (2013). 
6
 M.Pollack, ‘Esquecimento e Silêncio, Estudos Históricos’, 2,3 (1989), p.10 cited by by AN. Souto, ‘Memory 
and identity in the History of Frelimo’, p.284 
7
 Ibid 
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Literature Review/Background 
 
The thesis is builds on three bodies of literature: (a) historical literature on the concept of 
solidarity; (b) literature on the relationship between ZANU, ZAPU and Frelimo; (c) literature 
on Mozambican poetry and song; and (d) literature on the cartoon figure, Xiconhoca.  
 
The concept of Solidarity  
The network alliances that tied together the liberation movements of Southern Africa were 
defined as solidarity. This concept emerged in the 18th century as a borrowing from theology, 
relating to the Roman law expression, obligation in solidum, which was linked to the 
principle of friendship and natural brotherhood.8As Haoke Brunkhorst argues, this concept 
stressed the Christian principle based on the idea that one human being is for all, others and 
all for one. Within this religious principle, the concept has been developed in a context that 
brought together unfamiliar person, complementary roles and heterogeneous interest in the 
medium of abstract law.9 By the nineteenth century, in the aftermath of the French 
Revolution, the concept of solidarity acquires more clear-cut social and political 
connections.10 Karl Metz argues that as a political and social function, the concept of 
solidarity has its roots in the legal world which claimed for liberty, equality and fraternity.11 
However, along the years the concept had evolved and it has been explored looking at 
disciplines such as Psychology, Sociology, History, and Biology among many others. At a 
micro level, solidarity has been conceptualised across different situations as: help and 
supporting provided in situations of need; doing one’s share situations of cooperation; 
fairness in situations of distributing goods; avoiding breach in situations of trust; and moral 
repair when violations have taken place.12 
It is this kind of solidarity of supporting and helping each other in situation of need 
that characterised network alliances during the struggle for independence and black 
sovereignty in Southern Africa. Many authors have explored the solidarity that connected the 
liberation movements of Southern Africa. Although there is an extensive body of literature 
                                                          
8 A. Laitinen and A. Birgitta Pes, ‘Solidarity: Theory and Pratice. An Introduction’, in A. Laitinen and A. 
Birgitta Pes (ed), Solidarity: Theory and Pratice (Polymouth, Lexington Book SA, 2014), p.2 
9 H. Brunkhorst, Solidarity: From civic Friendship to a Global Community (Cambridge, MIT Press, 2005). p.2 
10 K. Bayertz, ‘Four uses of Solidarity’, in K. Bayertz (ed), Solidarity, Philosophical Studies in Contemporary 
Culture, Vol.5 (Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1999), p.29 
11 K. Metz, ‘Solidarity and History: Institutions and Social Concepts of Solidarity in 19th Century Western 
Europe’, in Kurt Bayertz (ed), Solidarity , p.191 
12 A. Laitinen and A. Birgitta Pes, ‘Solidarity: Theory and Pratice. An Introduction’, p.7 
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which explores the solidarity in the context of liberation movement of Southern Africa, most 
of these explorations approach this solidarity in two perspectives. 
One of those perspectives relates to the interaction that was established between 
liberation movements and international networks around the world. Peter Limb, who 
explored the anti-apartheid solidarity in Australia and New Zealand, looks at it as a 
movement which overflowed the narrow bounds of nations or movements.13 This movement 
worldwide has been characterised as ‘a network of local, national and transnational groups 
and institutions’, a globalised new social movement or ‘imagined community of solidarity 
activists.14 Håkan Thörn also explores the solidarity in Southern African liberation as a 
transnational movement. According to him, this solidarity movement could be seen as a 
transnational ‘movement of movements’, because the broader network of Southern African 
liberation movements and solidarity movements make a case for contemporary theorising and 
research on transnational movements and global civil society.15Along the same lines, Hilary 
Sapire also explores the solidarity in Southern Africa as transnational, but she looks to this 
‘transnationality’ as a platform that permitted the liberation movement’s militants, 
particularly people that were exiled and activists of civil organisations, to interact with and 
influence one another.16 As she argues, the border-crossing peripatetic lifestyles of liberation 
movements created a symbiotic relationship between the liberation and solidarity movements 
that originated in the increased number of political activists in organisations.17 
The other perspective on solidarity in Southern African liberation struggles relates to 
the relationships developed among liberation movements themselves on the ground, 
especially in the camps. According to Christian Williams, those liberation movements, 
particularly FRELIMO, SWAPO, ANC, MPLA and ZAPU developed a guerrilla affiliated 
relationship between themselves, sharing military strategies as well as cultural 
manifestations. This solidarity relationship was extended to local people who lived in 
Kongwa and with whom those militants used to interact, sharing farming food, medical aid, 
                                                          
13 P. Limb, ‘The Anti-apartheid Movements in Australia and Aotearoa/New Zealand’, in South African 
Democracy Education Trust, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Vol. 3, International Solidarity (Pretoria, 
Unisa Press, 2008) 
14 P. Limb, ‘The Anti-apartheid Movements in Australia and Aotearoa/New Zealand’, p.909 
15 H. Thörn, ‘The Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa and the Emergence of a Global Civil Society: 
Suggestions for Further Research’, in Chris Saunders, Documenting Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa 
(Pretoria, Nordiska Afrikainstituted, 2010), p. 112 
16 H. Sapire, ‘Liberation movements, Exiles and International Solidarity: An Introduction’. Journal of Southern 
African Studies, 35, 2, (2003), p.276 
17 H. Sapire, ‘Liberation Movements, Exiles and International Solidarity’, p.276 
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and so on.18 In the same vein, John Day regards solidarity among liberation movements in 
Southern Africa as a movement that established regional networks of patronage and 
dependence, fighting side by side, living in the same neighbourhoods and camps, exchanging 
views and information, and hosting each other.19 Henning Melber defines solidarity that was 
established among liberation movements as a living moral, ethical and political obligation, 
which entails empathy as much as the loyalty to fundamental human values of equality and 
dignity to which all human beings should be entitled in an undivided manner.20 In the same 
perspective as the authors above, David Martin and Phyllis Johnson explore the solidarity 
among liberation movements themselves, but focus only on military relationships. According 
to Martin and Johnson, the relationship of solidarity between liberation movements in 
Southern Africa was expressed through military alliances, which were sustained by the fact 
that they were supported by Moscow or China. However, liberation movements that received 
assistance from Moscow developed a special relationship with each other as natural allies.21 
 
Alliances between Frelimo and Zimbabwean liberation movements 
 
In general, the historiography about the relationships between Zimbabwe and Mozambique 
focus on political and military cooperation. Most of this literature explores this perspective 
from the point of view of Zimbabwean militants, based on what Terence Ranger calls 
‘patriotic History’, which produced an official discourse that promotes the military image of 
the liberation struggle, the victorious party and its claim to perpetuity.22 
The other body of literature comes from the point of view of Mozambican militants, 
mostly written in form of biographies by nationalist veterans. Those touches with very little 
detail upon the political and military cooperation between Frelimo and ZANU, their 
narratives appearing as simple accounts, with no objectives or aims other than telling the 
story of what the author believes was important in his or her life’s journey.23 In general, these 
                                                          
18 C.Williams, ‘Practicing Pan-Africanism: An Anthropological Perspective on Exile-host Relations at Kongwa, 
Tanzania’, Anthropology Southern Africa, 37,3 (2014), p. 277 
19 J. Day, International Nationalism: The Extra-Territorial Relations of Southern Rhodesian African 
Nationalists (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967) 
20 H. Melber, ‘On the Limits to Liberation in Southern Africa’ in C. Saunders, Documenting Liberation Struggle 
in Southern Africa (Pretoria, Nordiska Afrikainstituted, 2010), p.40. 
21 D. Martin and P. Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga war (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 
2001),  pp11-12 
22 T. Ranger, ‘Nationalist Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation: The Struggle over the 
Past in Zimbabwe’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 30, 2, (2004), pp. 215-234. 
23 A.N. Souto, ‘Memory and Identity in the History of Frelimo: Some Research Themes’, Kronos, 39, 1, (2013). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
7 
 
biographies and historical memories fit in what Borges Coelho calls the ‘liberation script’: a 
coherent and fixed narrative corpus made of a sequence of events in a timeline and ordered in 
a number of broad phases which operate within Frelimo’s framework.24 
According to Luise White the support that Frelimo offered to ZANU was very 
important because the Zimbabwean guerrilla had access to about 1200 km of the border 
between Mozambique and Rhodesia.25 For Terence Ranger this access to the border allowed 
many young men from Zimbabwe’s rural areas to flee to Mozambique in order to join the 
guerrilla.26 Ngwabi Bhebe also underlined the importance of the easy access between 
Zimbabwe and Mozambique to the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. According to him, with 
such a vast pool of potential recruits, ZANU was able to open about seven training camps in 
Mozambique. Jocelyn Alexander and Joan Mc Gregor also emphasis the Mozambican role in 
the development of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe. They show convincingly that this 
support improved the relationship between the two Zimbabwean guerrillas (ZAPU and 
ZANU), which began to improve as a result of intense pressure in an effort to unite these two 
movements under one military command.27 Zvakanyorwa Sadomba goes further by arguing 
that the support that Frelimo gave to the leaders of ZANU was important because it clearly 
illustrates the internal ideology struggle. In fact, as he points out, it was within this space that 
a potent mix of ideas about ancestral land, modernist collectivisation and international capital 
emerged.28 
Like most of the authors above, I will also engage with the liberation struggle in its 
transnational aspects; contrary to them, however, I will explore this relationship from another 
perspective – namely, the relationship established between and among ZANU and Frelimo 
soldiers as well as Mozambican people on the ground. 
 
 
 
                                                          
24 J.p. Borges Coelho, ‘Politics and Contemporary History in Mozambique: A set of Epistemological Notes’, 
Kronos, 39, 1, (2013), p.21. 
25 L. White, The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo: Texts and Politics in Zimbabwe (Indianapolis, Indian 
University Press, 2003) 
26 T. Ranger, Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe: A Comparative Study (London, 
University of California Press, 1998) 
27 J. Alexander and J. McGregor ‘War Stories. Guerrilla Narratives of Zimbabwe’s Liberation War’, History 
Workshop Journal, ( 2004)  
28 Z. Sadomba, War Veterans in Zimbabwe’s Revolution. Challenging Neo-Colonialism and Settler and 
International Capital (London, James Currey, 2011) 
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Literature about cultural manifestations in Mozambique  
 
The popular support given to ZANU in Mozambique was also conveyed and channeled 
through songs, letters and poetry. Many authors have explored the role of cultural 
manifestations in Mozambique even before independence. According to Leroy Vail and 
Landeg White, Mozambicans used songs as jeers which reject injustice, satire, protest and 
lament against the colonial regime.29 Maria Benedita Basto stresses that during the colonial 
period, poetry, like song, protested against Portuguese’s injustice, and also started to express 
a desire of being Mozambican, linking up to themes of negritude explored in other contexts.30 
Nevertheless, with the liberation struggle the poetry and songs acquired a 
revolutionary aspect and started to be informed by a ‘vocabulary of ready-made ideas’, in 
which there is a proliferation of watchwords such as ‘nationalist’, ‘revolutionary’, ‘victory’, 
‘heroes’ and ‘traitors’.31 Paolo Israel calls attention to the fact that song and dances only 
came to be important in the Frelimo’s liberation struggle after the internal crisis within 
FRELIMO in 1970. After that, culture became a weapon of combat and it was used for 
military unity and to exalt the Frelimo struggle and the revolutionary process of building the 
new nation.32. To Jenne Penvenne and Bento Sitoe, with independence poetry and songs were 
used to celebrate and claim legitimacy.33 
I argue that although the songs and poems stressed the moral duty to support 
Zimbabwean struggle, they also a reproduced the official revolutionary discourse. These 
poems and songs seems to be a reproduction of the words of Samora Machel, presenting 
watchwords such as: ‘Don’t cry child, because your father answered the call of the 
revolutions’, ‘Supporting the struggle for Zimbabwe’s liberation movement is defending 
Mozambique’, ‘Let us support our Zimbabwean brothers’, etc 34So, the secondary literature 
discussed above offered me a solid historical background to critically analyse the songs and 
poems about the support the struggle for Zimbabwe. 
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Xiconhoca and the Mozambique Revolution 
 
After the independence of Mozambique the cartoon figure of Xiconhoca was also used to 
shape Frelimo’s revolutionary ideology and to condemn those who were against the process 
of building the new man. This cartoon figure was created by Frelimo’s Departamento de 
Informação e propaganda da Frelimo (Office for Information and Propaganda) in 1976.35 
Immediately, it became omnipresent in radio messages, murals, posters, newspaper and 
magazine features. Lars Buurs argues that the Xiconhoca’s cartoon was skillfully designed to 
convey and represent its social, political and ideologically message and comes to stand for a 
host of negative figures that undermine the new state through ideological and moral decay.36 
Meneses stresses that the ethical and political messages that this figure of Xiconhoca brought 
were transformed in the behaviour to avoid within the revolutionary process of building the 
new society.37 In other words, Xiconhoca was to embody the enemy of people, that is, the 
drunkard, lazy, bureaucratic, traitor, people with the colonial mentality and so on.  
The image of Xiconhoca was also used as propaganda against the regime of Ian Smith 
in Rhodesia, because as Machava points out, Frelimo viewed national independence as a 
transitional phase from one struggle to another. It meant that the battle against Portuguese 
colonialism had been won, but the same and permanent enemy (capitalist-imperialism) now 
represented by racist South Africa and Rhodesia, would use new and more subtle tactics to 
discredit socialism and destroy the people’s revolution in Mozambique.38` 
My dissertation analyses the kind of message that the figure of Xiconhoca conveyed 
about the Zimbabwean liberation, looking at ideological as well as aesthetic aspects.  
 
The Dualism of Solidarity  
The support to Zimbabwean liberation struggle can be analysed from two angles: as a form of 
ideological coercion; and as driven by an authentic popular enthusiasm and investment.  
On the one hand, there was a kind of identification in the cause of one another. The 
fact that Mozambicans had experienced a colonial regime based on racial difference made 
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people see the support to the Zimbabwean liberation struggle as the fulfillment of a moral 
duty. This identification was stressed by historical, economic and cultural relationship 
between Zimbabwean and Mozambican people, particularly among those who lived in the 
border areas.39 This moral duty was strongly established from the rural areas particularly 
those areas which share the border with Zimbabwe.  
On other hand, this support was established within a context in which Frelimo 
attempted to build a notion of the ‘socialist new man’, guided by ideology and moral 
principles.40 Frelimo stressed the idea that ‘Who is not with us, is against us,’ to impose its 
authority and legitimacy.41 In order to achieve its legitimacy and hegemony, the party-state 
used an authoritarian discourse and forms of ideological control to establish collective 
identity and punish and isolate all those who were considered as obstacle to Frelimo’s 
objectives and ideology, calling them enemies of the revolution. This discourse was ridden 
with paranoia. As Benedito Machava argues, the party-state used suspicion, intimidation, 
violence and punishment as the core ingredients of state-building in Mozambique.42 Such 
ideological control was enforced through practical means, such as the creation of military 
compulsory law which obliged all Mozambicans irrespective of their gender to be trained and 
join to the arms in order to fighter against Ian Smith, the creation of the Solidarity Bank in 
1976, in which Mozambican workers were required to contribute one day of salary every 
month to support Zimbabwean liberation; or by propaganda, through the use of the cartoon 
figure of Xiconhoca. Xiconhoca represented an evil and the negative social, political and 
moral attitude that Frelimo wanted to eliminate: the bad aspect within the revolutionary 
process-the traitor, the lazy, the drunkard, the thief. Therefore Mozambican’s support to 
ZANU occurred in a context of strong ideological control exercised by FRELIMO and its 
political idea of building the new man, based in a dichotomy: heroes, those who does well, 
following the FRELIMO ideas and enemies, those who are against the revolutionary 
process.43 This ideological coercion was much visibly in the urban areas, where people did 
not interacted closely with the Zimbabwean fighters contrary to the rural areas.  
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Argument 
The goal of this research is to understand the dynamics of ZANU presence in Mozambique 
during the first five years of Mozambique’s independence (1975 and 1980), as well as to 
interrogate the category of solidarity used by liberation movements, in order to understand it 
in more complex terms—neither as mere coercion nor as wholehearted enthusiasm, but as a 
mixture of both and the result of specific interactions between people on the ground.  
 My argument will therefore be two fold. On the one hand I will try to highlight the 
spirit of mutual cooperation and brotherhood between people who shared the same historical 
and cultural background, as being a main factor behind the support offered by Mozambican 
people to ZANU. On the other hand, I will demonstrate how solidarity was also the result of 
an authoritarian effort by FRELIMO to impose a political and ideologically consciousness. 
This consciousness was shaped through the creation of legal instruments to ensure popular 
support such as, the creation of the Solidarity Bank in 1976; by the use of an authoritarian 
discourse which relied on a ‘vocabulary of ready-made ideas’44; as well as by the use of the 
cartoon figure of Xiconhoca which stigmatised all those who did not support solidarity with 
ZANU as traitors or sold-outs. 
 
Methodology 
My research is based on three kinds of historical evidence: archival material; songs; and 
visual material relating to the character of Xiconhoca. 
 
1. Archival research.  
To generate research material for my analysis, I conducted archival research at the Frelimo 
Archives, particularly the Diplomacy and International Relationship section. Here, I looked at 
the correspondence exchanged between Frelimo and ZANU as well as documents about 
solidarity agreements. These documents gave me an idea about the roots of alliances between 
Frelimo and ZANU during Frelimo’s liberation struggle.  
I also explored the Ministry of State Administration’s Archive and the Arquivo 
Histórico de Moçambique. At these archives I looked at press articles published during 1975 
to 1980, particularly the daily news Notícias as well as the weekly Tempo. At these press 
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articles I explored news about the presence of ZANU in Mozambique and the messages 
spread by the leaders and people at the rallies in supporting to Zimbabwe liberation struggle.  
I also used the Aluka Jstor Online Archive to explore the collection Struggles for 
Freedom in Southern Africa, which contains sources about solidarity between liberation 
movements in Southern Africa, particularly the Southern Africa Magazine, a monthly 
magazine published by Southern Africa Committee in the United States, and also the 
Zimbabwe News, the ZANU’s official publication during the liberation struggle. I also have 
been exploring the website Mozambique History Net, which contains newspapers and sources 
of contemporary Mozambique History. My aim was to analyse how the international news 
looked at the support that Mozambique gave to ZANU as well as trough ZANU’s point of 
view.  
 
2. Songs interpretation 
By exploring the Radio Mozambique archive, I engaged with the lyrics of popular songs that 
support the Zimbabwean liberation. My aim was to look at unofficial and official discourse in 
other to understand in which ways the freedom of expression that characterise the unofficial 
songs were repressed by Frelimo’s ‘vocabulary of ready-made ideas’. At the same time, I 
engaged with these lyrics’ songs to explore Mozambique’s commitment to the struggle for 
Zimbabwe. I also analysed how readers expressed their position regarding the support to the 
Zimbabwean struggle, looking at letters and poetry published at the newspapers. 
 
3. Visual image of Xiconhoca 
I also engaged with the visual image of the cartoon figure of Xiconhoca, published in press 
article by the party-state (such as Tempo and Notícias). Here I analysed how Frelimo used 
Xiconhoca as a coercive visual form to support Zimbabwean liberation. To achieve this 
objective, I was to explore the ideologically coercion and vocabulary translating by visual 
image of Xiconhoca.  
 
4. Oral testimonies 
Alongside with the above sources, I also engaged with oral testimonies. I conducted 
interviews with two kinds of people: Mozambican militants who struggled alongside ZANU 
militants in Mozambique’s borders as well as inside Zimbabwe; and also with ‘ordinary 
people’ who interacted directly with ZANU and Zimbabwean refugees in the border areas. 
These interviews helped me to address issues that the archival material does not explore, 
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while they gave me a perspective on the popular view about this support. Basically, I asked 
the following questions: Why Mozambicans helped or did not help ZANU and ANC 
militants? What mechanisms or strategies of support were used? What ties and what frictions 
emerged from the interaction between Mozambican citizens and their guests? Which role did 
preceding trans-border relations play (e.g. of kinship)? What were the obstacles supporters 
had to face (on the local and national level)? In which way did the central government try to 
influence or control this support on the ground?  
 
Thesis Structure  
The dissertation is comprised of three chapters.  
In the first chapter, ‘A Luta Continua in Mozambique Indenpendent: Frelimo–ZANU 
Relations in Mozambique (1975–1980)’, I examine the relationships established between 
ZANU militants and Mozambicans, particularly in border areas. The aim of this chapter is to 
analyse the ways in which Mozambican people interacted with ZANU militants. This chapter 
begins with exploring the roots of the alliance between Frelimo and ZANU during Frelimo’s 
liberation struggle. It also analyses the ways in which Frelimo (with other Frontline States) 
had shaped a political alliance between Zimbabwean liberation movements as well as its role 
in the process of negotiate the independence of Zimbabwe. Finally, the chapter explores the 
military dynamics established between Frelimo soldiers and Zimbabwean fighters, as well as 
the role of ordinary people in that military support.  
The second chapter, ‘When the unofficial meets the official: Poems, Letters, Songs’, 
analyses letters and poetry published in the press articles as well as the lyrics of popular 
songs about the struggle for Zimbabwe. The objective is to discuss the feelings and 
perspectives of Mozambican people about the support to ZANU. My aim is to look at these 
cultural expressions and trace the influence of the party-state into it. In that chapter, I begin 
with exploring the characteristics of cultural manifestations during the colonial period in 
order to understand their background. Secondly, I analyse how the ‘vocabulary of ready-
made ideas’ was born and how Frelimo used it to shape an official discourse. Third and last, I 
engage with the cultural manifestations that support the Zimbabwe struggle in order to 
explore in which ways they express a moral duty or represent Frelimo’s official discourse.  
The third and last chapter, ‘Xiconhoca, the saboteurs of the Zimbabwean struggle’, 
will try to understand how the image of Xiconhoca was used as a visual medium to support 
the struggle for Zimbabwe. Firstly, I started with exploring the meaning of Xiconhoca within 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
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the revolutionary process. Then, through the reading of the image and its ideological 
message, I explore how the carton figure of Xiconhoca was used by the party-state to enforce 
ideological coercion on Mozambican people to support for Zimbabwe as well as a way of 
propaganda against the regime of Ian Smith. In other words, in this chapter I engage with the 
textual message as well as its visual features of the cartoon figure of Xiconhoca. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter I 
A Luta Continua in Mozambique independent  
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Frelimo–ZANU Relations, 1975–1980 
 
Introduction  
In most parts of southern Africa, independence came after prolonged nationalist armed 
struggles against white minority regimes. The struggle for liberation in southern Africa was 
not confined to the region proper, but extended to other parts of Africa. As a result, some 
independent African countries became important host nations, both for the southern African 
liberation movements and refugee populations from the region.45 Southern African liberation 
movements developed political and military co-operation with each other, establishing 
regional networks of patronage and dependence, fighting side by side, living in the same 
neighbourhoods and camps, exchanging views and information, and hosting each other.46 It is 
in part because of this spirit of co-operation that the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique 
(Frelimo) established political and military co-operation with the Zimbabwe African National 
Union (ZANU) in the early 1970s, to launch its offensive into Rhodesia alongside its own 
campaign in Mozambique. Following the dawn of Mozambican independence in 1975, 
Frelimo allowed ZANU’s military wing, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army 
(ZANLA), formally to establish guerrilla bases on Mozambican soil.  
This chapter explores the political and military relationship between Mozambicans 
and ZANU, from 1975 to 1980. Specifically, it examines the ways in which FRELIMO elites 
and Mozambican citizens supported and interacted with the ZANU militants. 
I argue that Frelimo’s co-operation with ZANU was partly motivated by a deep spirit 
of solidarity with the cause of Zimbabwean liberation. Ordinary Mozambicans, principally 
those who lived in the border areas in Manica, Tete and Chicualacuala, partook in this 
extension of support to ZANU because of Frelimo’s revolutionary ideology and political 
propaganda, which strongly enunciated that Mozambique’s liberation was incomplete in the 
absence of independence for its Zimbabwean neighbours. This promotion from above of a 
sense of solidarity was aided by factors operating below: that is, the common ancestry, 
language and culture of Mozambicans and Zimbabweans living in the border zones. None the 
less, Frelimo was not supportive of ZANU initially because it saw ZANU as having created 
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unnecessary division in the Zimbabwean liberation movement through its 1963 break away 
from the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU). Frelimo–ZANU relations improved 
only because of ZANU’s effective demonstration of a stronger commitment to and plan for 
armed struggle than ZAPU. Still, improved Frelimo–ZANU relations were far from 
uncomplicated, because of disagreements over guerrilla tactics. Furthermore, certain ZANLA 
guerrillas opposed Frelimo soldiers’ involvement in intimate relationships with local women 
when they were operating in the Rhodesian warfront alongside ZANLA. Lastly, owing to the 
economic burden of hosting ZANU, Frelimo adopted a pragmatic approach to the fight for 
Zimbabwean independence. In practice, this meant that Frelimo actively supported ZANLA’s 
military operations, but it was not averse to the possibility of a negotiated independence 
settlement. On the other hand, players such as Mhanda and a number of ZIPA commanders 
were entirely opposed to the prospect of a negotiated independence agreement at the 1976 
Geneva conference. Mugabe also proved to be an unpragmatic negotiator at the 1979 
Lancaster House independence conference. Consequently, Frelimo forced Mhanda and ZIPA 
to attend the 1976 Geneva conference, and in 1979 Mugabe agreed a settlement at Lancaster 
House after a firm warning from Frelimo that if he did not sign the agreement, Mozambique 
would cease to host ZANU. 
We do not know enough about the complexity of relations between host governments 
and liberation movements operating from their territory, and we know even less about how 
transnational military relationships actually worked. This chapter goes some way towards 
addressing these lacunae by showing the extent of the political and military influence that 
hosts wielded on liberation movements based in their countries. Frelimo used its influence as 
host to initiate an alliance between ZANU and ZAPU and their respective armies, and it took 
sides in ZANU’s 1976–77 internal political leadership struggle. On both issues, Frelimo’s 
word was hardly law, because the agency and interests of ZANU and ZAPU actors prevailed 
ultimately. But as we shall see, Frelimo retained its sovereign rights, thus it could one-sidedly 
determine how long ZANU continued to stage its liberation war from Mozambican soil.  
 
The Roots of Political Alliance: Frelimo and ZANU, 1968–1974 
The beginnings of the relationship between ZANU and Frelimo were fraught with difficulty. 
As Martin and Johnson affirm, a coalition existed among a number of liberation movements 
in southern Africa that considered themselves as the ‘authentic’ groups struggling for the 
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independence of their countries from colonial rule.47 These so called authentic movements 
included: Mozambique’s Frelimo; ZAPU from Zimbabwe; Namibia’s South West African 
People’s Organisation (SWAPO); the African National Congress (ANC) from South Africa; 
and Angola’s Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA). This coalition of 
liberation movements stood firm against rival movements in the region, which they labelled 
as inauthentic or dissident. These so called inauthentic southern African liberation 
movements were: ZANU; South Africa’s Pan Africanist Congress (PAC); Frente Nacional de 
Libertação de Angola (FNLA) and União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola 
(UNITA); and Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique (Coremo) from Mozambique. One of 
the factors that helped to forge the authentic alliance is that its constituent actors were all 
supported by the Soviet Union, while the inauthentic movements were backed mainly by 
China.48 Frelimo regarded ZANU with suspicion – more so since ZANU split from Frelimo’s 
authentic ally, ZAPU, in 1963.49 For Frelimo, the formation of ZANU was a catalyst for 
further division in what ought to have been a single unitary liberation movement. Frelimo 
also had strong historical ties with ZAPU. Many Mozambican nationalists who went into 
exile in the early 1960s were supported by ZAPU, which helped them to create the União 
Democrática Nacional de Moçambique (Udenamo) in Rhodesia, and to leave Rhodesia for 
Tanzania, where they developed their political and military goals.50 Udenamo joined two 
other Mozambican nationalist movements, namely Mozambique African National Union 
(MANU) and União Africana de Moçambique Independente (UNAMI), to create Frelimo in 
1962. Frelimo fighters also established close relationships with ZAPU comrades at Kongwa 
camp in Tanzania from 1964 to 1966.51 In fact, in the 1960s Frelimo and ZAPU, as well as 
fighters from the ANC and SWAPO, had inhabited neighbouring camps at Kongwa, where 
they trained in guerrilla warfare. The liberation movements in Tanzania sometimes organised 
cultural events, to which they invited each other.52 Lopes Tembe, a Frelimo veteran who 
trained at Kongwa camp and subsequently became an assistant of Samora Machel, points out 
that organised cultural events such as concerts, poetry reading and theatre took place on 
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Fridays, with the objective of promoting inter-cultural exchanges.53 He also stressed that 
relations were facilitated by the widespread use of Kiswahili by liberation movements to 
communicate with each other as well as with local people.54 
ZANU, from the time of its formation in 1963, therefore had to work towards building 
trust with Frelimo, as well as with the Tanzanian and Zambian leaders. According to Mariano 
Matsinha, a Frelimo representative in Zambia who was responsible for organising the armed 
struggle in Tete province, the relationship between ZANU and Frelimo dates back to 1968, 
when ZANU first asked Frelimo if it could operate from Mozambique’s Tete.55 ZANU made 
this request since it was geographically more convenient to open the north-eastern war front 
from Tete rather than from its Zambian base, and because Rhodesian forces had created a 
‘cordon sanitaire’ along the Zambezi river.56 In the face of ZANU’s strong commitment to 
armed struggle, Frelimo gradually began to allow ZANLA to carry out operations from areas 
that it controlled in Mozambique.57 This also allowed many people from Zimbabwe’s rural 
areas to escape the war by fleeing to Mozambique and join the liberation struggle. However, 
Frelimo found it complicated to establish a formal military agreement with ZANU while 
maintaining a political alliance with ZAPU. According to Matsinha, the Frelimo leadership 
was concerned that a formal military agreement with ZANU would be seen by ZAPU as 
betrayal of the authentic coalition. Frelimo tried to manage a potential fallout with ZAPU by 
offering it an opportunity to open a military front through Tete, but ZAPU failed to seize the 
initiative owing to internal divisions created by a revolt in 1971.58 Matsinha stated that, in the 
long run, ZANU proved to be a serious liberation movement with clearer objectives than 
ZAPU about armed struggle, and this won it Frelimo’s vote of confidence.59 
In 1970 ZANU sent ZANLA guerrillas for refresher training to Frelimo’s front in 
Tete. The first ZANLA guerrillas to be sent to Tete were Meya Urimbo, Justin Chaúke and 
William Ndangana. A subsequent ZANLA group included Josiah Tongogara, Joseph 
Chimurenga, Rex Nhongo and Dakarai Badza.60 While some of these militants took refresher 
courses only, others participated in a number of battles with Frelimo against the Portuguese 
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colonial army.61 ZANLA cadres also received Frelimo training focused on how effectively to 
mobilise the masses in Rhodesia to support ZANU and to assist by transporting weapons.62 In 
fact, in the early 1970s, when ZANU was building up material supplies and transferring 
weaponry from Chifombo in Zambia to Mucumbura on the border between Mozambique and 
Rhodesia, Mozambican peasants assisted them in transporting large quantities of ammunition 
to the Zimbabwean border.63 Tete was an important operational sphere for Frelimo in central 
Mozambique for many reasons. First, by holding Tete it could halt the Portuguese offensive 
on the Cabo Delgado and Niassa fronts. Second, this front would in turn allow Frelimo forces 
to advance on Manica and Sofala provinces, as well as enabling contact with much of the 
civilian population. Finally, Frelimo could threaten the on-going construction of the Cahora 
Bassa dam.64 
When ZANLA began military operations from Tete in 1972, Rhodesian troops 
attacked the region, bombing Frelimo- and ZANLA-controlled areas constantly. This 
complicated Frelimo’s own military action there, but Frelimo continued to support ZANLA.65 
According to Tembe, support for ZANLA also came from the people of Tete, who had been 
collaborating with Frelimo since the beginning of the struggle in that area.66 Besides 
supplying ZANLA with food, the people of Tete also carried ZANLA’s weapons and other 
military materials to the border with Rhodesia and offered shelter to Zimbabwean refugees in 
Tete.67 However, the support that Frelimo gave to ZANU was not restricted to this area. In 
1973, Tobias Dai, a Frelimo military instructor at Nachingwea camp in Tanzania, received a 
military contingent of nearly 100 ZANLA recruits for a six-month training course. According 
to Dai, the training given to the Zimbabwean guerrillas was different to that given to their 
Frelimo counterparts, because the Rhodesian forces, in contrast to the Portuguese military, 
used a wider range of air power, particularly attack helicopters.68 After Mozambican 
independence in June 1975, ties between Frelimo and ZANU became stronger. Frelimo 
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hosted ZANLA, first alongside ZIPRA as part of ZIPA, from 1975 to 1976. ZIPA was a 
creation of Machel and the Tanzanian president, Julius Nyerere, in order to further the 
Zimbabwean armed struggle amid deep division between the nationalist politicians.69 Frelimo 
continued to host ZANLA after ZIPRA withdrew from ZIPA in July 1976. Let me now turn 
to exploring in greater detail Frelimo’s relationship with ZANU from 1975 onwards.  
Frelimo and ZANU after 1975  
Mozambicans welcomed independence in 1975 with great euphoria. Frelimo’s propaganda 
stressed that Mozambique’s victory over Portuguese colonialism was made possible by the 
support and solidarity of many countries. Particular emphasis was given to the role played by 
Tanzania and Zambia, both of which hosted Frelimo military bases, from where war 
operations were co-ordinated for the liberation of Mozambique. Frelimo formalised 
Mozambique’s support to ZANU in 1975, following the proclamation of national 
independence. The constitution of 1975 stated that ‘the People’s Republic of Mozambique 
gives its support and solidarity to the struggle of the people for national liberation in the 
world’.70 When Frelimo became a vanguard Marxist-Leninist party in 1977, it reinforced the 
idea that solidarity with the Zimbabwean struggle and Zimbabwean refugees, as well as with 
exiled South African nationalists, was an intrinsic aspect of Mozambican citizenship. The so-
called ‘proletarian internationalism was expected to be an indispensable element in the 
character of a Mozambican citizen’.71 Thus, Frelimo adopted a radical stance in relation to 
ZANU, allowing it to establish its main military bases and refugee camps in Mozambique 
while pressuring (with Tanzania’s support) ZANU and ZAPU to unite under one military 
command.72 For the African leaders, the unity of the Zimbabwean liberation movements was 
essential for victory over the white Rhodesian regime. It is important to underline that this 
attempt to unite Zimbabwean liberation movements started in 1974, during what became 
known as the détente exercise, in which the front-line leaders, Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda of 
Zambia, Botswana’s Seretse Khama and Machel (who was not yet head of state), tried to 
unite the divided Zimbabwean nationalist parties, the African National Council (ANC), the 
Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (Frolizi), ZANU and ZAPU, so that they could 
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negotiate as a united front for an independence agreement with prime minister Ian Smith’s 
Rhodesian Front (RF) government.73 
The détente exercise did not succeed, because there was little genuine commitment to 
it from any side. The Smith regime wanted to use it as an instrument to eliminate the 
liberation guerrillas, while the nationalists remained deeply divided.74Another explanation for 
the failure of détente lies in the fact that it was originally an idea developed by Zambia and 
South Africa, rather than by the Zimbabwean liberation movements and the RF regime 
themselves. The Zambian government promoted détente for economic reasons: its economy 
was dependent on Rhodesia and South Africa. All Zambian exports and 95 per cent of its 
imports travelled through transport networks controlled by South Africa and Rhodesia or by 
the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique. Zambia would pay a significant 
economic price for a prolonged independence war in Rhodesia.75 The South African 
apartheid regime promoted the coming to power of a moderate black government in Rhodesia 
because it feared the alternative – the rise to power of a radical communist government – that 
would leave it isolated as the last bastion of anti-communism in the region.76 
The failure of the détente initiative and the nationalist politicians’ wrangling resulted 
in Machel and Nyerere turning their efforts to supporting Zimbabwe’s armed struggle.77 In 
fact, with the independence of Mozambique, ZANLA transferred its headquarters from 
Zambia to Mozambique, where they co-ordinated all infiltration operations through eastern 
Rhodesia. This geographic proximity made it easier for ZANLA to transport materiel into 
Rhodesia and to receive and train new recruits.78 However, Frelimo’s formal hosting of 
ZANLA began when ZANLA was part of the Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA), which was 
a union of ZIPRA and ZANLA engineered by Machel and Nyerere in November 1975 
because of their disgruntlement with nationalist politicians’ constant feuding. ZIPA fighters 
were brought together in two training camps in Tanzania – Morogoro and Mgagao – and they 
launched attacks into Rhodesia from Mozambique.79 In an interview with Africa News in 
New York, Machel explained why it was important to have military unity between ZIPRA 
and ZANLA: 
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[i]t is the desire of all of us that there is only one army in Zimbabwe.… the army is a symbol 
of national unity, and therefore cannot be fragmented. Such fragmentation would mean 
retracting to a state of primitivism of tribal armies and feudal armies … The job of the army 
today is to guarantee tranquillity and permit the development of the country … If it is divided, 
it cannot carry out its essential task of security, tranquillity, peace, maintenance of order and 
maintaining the people’s confidence.80 
 
Despite the desire of Machel and Nyerere to prop up ZIPA, the joint army was undermined 
by deep, long-standing suspicion between ZIPRA and ZANLA, lack of commitment to co-
operate by the two armies, and conflicting methods and standards of training.81 By July 1976, 
the ZIPRA–ZANLA unity had collapsed. ZIPRA withdrew to Zambia, leaving ZANLA as 
the sole ZIPA army.  
Relations between the Zimbabwean liberation movements and the front-line leaders 
were also not free from strain and suspicion. A pertinent issue that caused much friction 
between ZANU and the front-line leaders had to do with ZANU’s 1974 internal power 
struggle and the way in which front-line leaders reacted to it. For the 1974 détente 
negotiations, the ZANU central committee sent Mugabe to Lusaka as its leader. But the front-
line leaders regarded Mugabe with suspicion, because he had come to the meeting in place of 
Ndabaningi Sithole, whom they recognised as the legitimate president of ZANU.82 The 
central committee had deposed Sithole for unspecified irregularities and without calling an 
elective congress. As a result, the front-line leaders, Machel particularly, regarded Sithole’s 
removal as a coup and refused to recognise Mugabe’s leadership, insisting that Sithole attend 
the détente talks as leader instead.83 Mugabe returned to Rhodesia following the détente talks 
and, in March 1975, the ZANU leadership in Salisbury resolved that Mugabe and Tekere 
travel to Mozambique to provide the ZANLA guerrillas there with political leadership and in 
order to avoid re-arrest by the Rhodesian government.84 In April 1975, Mugabe entered 
Mozambique without the Frelimo leadership’s knowledge. Martin and Johnson maintain that 
this secrecy was necessary because Mozambique was still in a transitional process to 
independence, so it was obligatory that they avoid detection by Portuguese forces, who could 
provide the Rhodesian state with intelligence of their whereabouts in Mozambique or capture 
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and deport Mugabe and Tekere to Rhodesia.85 The Frelimo leadership discovered that 
Mugabe was in Mozambique after Moiane was introduced to him by the ZIPA commander, 
Rex Nhongo, at the military quarters called Junta, where the ZIPA commanders were based. 
Moiane had gone there to resolve a dispute between ZANLA and ZIPRA.86 When Machel 
received news from Moiane about Mugabe’s presence among the ZIPA commanders, he was 
displeased, and so in time Machel moved Mugabe and Tekere to Quelimane, far away from 
the guerrillas and the border with Rhodesia. Matsinha, who was sent to Manica by Machel to 
communicate the Mozambican leader’s decision to move Mugabe and Tekere, explained that 
Machel looked upon Mugabe with suspicion because of the irregular manner in which he and 
other ZANU leaders had attempted to depose Sithole from the ZANU presidency in 1974.87 
Only in 1976 was Mugabe allowed to leave Quelimane, in order to participate in the 
Geneva conference of October–December 1976, which aimed to achieve a negotiated 
settlement for Rhodesia. The Frelimo government changed its position on Mugabe’s 
leadership because, as Matsinha argues, ZANLA guerrillas continued to maintain that 
Mugabe was their leader, hence Machel’s suspicion of him began to decrease.88 In addition, 
Frelimo pushed for Mugabe and the ZAPU leader, Joshua Nkomo, to form a united front at 
the Geneva conference. Thus in October 1976 the Patriotic Front, led by Mugabe and 
Nkomo, was agreed. The Patriotic Front served as a tactical unity for the purpose of 
presenting a common approach to the Geneva conference, but each liberation movement 
would continue to maintain its own identity and independence.89 The Geneva talks were 
unsuccessful, and military unity between ZIPRA and ZANLA never materialised for the 
remainder of the liberation war, as evinced in the Frelimo cadre Mateus Zengeni’s 
observation that Mozambican soldiers who fought alongside ZANLA guerrillas sometimes 
had to fight against ZIPRA inside Rhodesia.90 
In early 1977, the old-guard ZANLA commander Josiah Tongogara, who had been 
released from prison by the Zambian government in October 1976, in collusion with Nhongo, 
Mugabe and Frelimo, arrested some of the ZIPA commanders for resisting the dissolution of 
ZIPA.91 The arrest of ZIPA commanders such as Dzinashe Machingura, David Todhlana and 
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Parker Chipoera, among others, marked the end of Machel’s ZIPA experiment. ZANLA was 
reconstituted, and Machel provided it with support. The arrested ZIPA leaders were held in 
Frelimo prisons until Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980.92 According to Matsinha, Frelimo 
carried out the arrests following a request by the ZANU leadership and because it wanted to 
re-affirm its support for Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle.93 Mugabe was made ZANU’s 
president by the party’s central committee at a meeting that took place in Chimoio, 
Mozambique, in August 1976.94 Mugabe publicly proclaimed that unity between the 
liberation movements was necessary to achieve independence, and he also adopted Marxism-
Leninism: 
 
[t]he Zimbabwe African National Union is particularly privileged to learn from Frelimo, on a 
day to day basis. The slow but definite transformation of ZANU into becoming the leading 
liberation movement in Zimbabwe, guided by Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse Tung thought, has 
been as much a result of the party’s role as main fighting force against the Ian Smith regime 
as of its association with Frelimo.95 
 
Mugabe’s rhetorical embrace of Frelimo’s emphasis on unity and his pretensions of being 
guided by Marxism-Leninism also explain why he received Frelimo’s support from 1977 
onwards.96I now turn to examining military co-operation between Frelimo and ZANLA after 
the demise of ZIPA.  
 
Frelimo and ZANU in the post-ZIPA Era 
During the ZIPA phase, Frelimo established military forces at the main border crossings with 
Rhodesia. The main objective was to support and cover the entrance and exit of Zimbabwean 
guerrillas. These Frelimo forces were stationed in Gaza, Manica and Tete.97 The principal 
points of entry in Gaza province were through Mavué and Chitanga in Massegena and Pafuri 
(Muenze river) in Chicualacuala. In Manica, the principal points were Catandica, Mavonde, 
Machipanda, Changuro, Rotanda, Guro and Espungabera. In Tete, it was through Zumbo, 
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Mucumbura, Luia and Chioca.98 Batissone Mabolessi, a Mozambican soldier who operated in 
Chicualacuala, explained joint ZANLA–Frelimo operations in the following terms: ‘[t]he 
Mozambican forces accompanied ZANLA fighters and all military materials that were 
discharged in Maputo Port. Those materials were taken to a ZANU base in Mapai. Then, 
under the cover of night, we accompanied them to Rhodesia, while some Mozambican troops 
stayed at the border to protect our operations’.99 
These joint operations sometimes involved active combat. According to Abílio Alface, 
a Mozambican soldier who participated in the joint operations by accompanying ZANLA 
guerrillas through Mavué right up to Chiredzi inside Rhodesia, he fought alongside ZANLA 
for a month in Chiredzi.100 In addition to planned joint military operations, Frelimo soldiers 
also participated in unexpected combat when, for instance,they were attacked by Rhodesian 
troops while accompanying ZANLA militants into Rhodesia or when Frelimo soldiers were 
returning alone to Mozambique.101 To facilitate operations at the war front, the Mozambican 
government established a base in Mapai, around 605 km from Pafuri (Chicualacuala) and 259 
km from Mavué (Massangena), and they stationed a battalion of soldiers there. Mapai 
functioned as a concentration area for ZANLA and its war material before they crossed the 
border. It was to Mapai that all those wounded in the war inside Rhodesia or Chicualacuala 
and Massangena were evacuated.  
Reacting to Mozambique’s decision to close the border with Rhodesia in March 1976 
and officially support ZANU’s liberation struggle, Rhodesian forces began military 
incursions inside Mozambique, killing ZANLA militants and civilians. Beginning in 1976, 
lots of press articles reported Rhodesian attacks on ZANU bases and Zimbabwean refugee 
camps in Mozambique. Most of these attacks were carried out in Gaza, Manica and Tete 
provinces.102 The objective of these raids was to peg back ZANLA incursions from 
Mozambique by inflicting substantial damage to ZANU camps and Frelimo troops.103 The 
Rhodesian forces used fighter jets, armed vehicles and mounted troops, with which they 
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destroyed ZANU bases and damaged railway links from Mozambique to Rhodesia.104 
Zengeni described one such Rhodesian attack on Chicualacuala in 1977 as follows: 
 
the Rhodesian forces had installed loud speakers on the border between Rhodesia and 
Chicualacuala. They used to play a song in the morning, called Sibongile (by the South 
African Mbaqanga group Soul Brothers) whose lyrics were ‘we do not want neighbours to see 
us fighting’.And when the song ended, the Rhodesian forces started to scream over the loud 
speaker in Portuguese: ‘atenção Frelimo, toma aí o matabicho’ (‘attention, Frelimo, receive 
your breakfast’). Then it began to rain bullets. We used to respond to those attacks, but 
unfortunately their weapons were too strong and they killed a lot of ZANLA guerrillas, who 
were in a transit camp to Rhodesia, as well as many Frelimo militants.105 
 
In 1976 and 1977, Mozambique lacked the capability for large-scale retaliation 
against the Rhodesians because it did not have equally sophisticated armour and air power, 
despite the fact that Mozambican soldiers were highly trained and experienced fighters.106 It 
is also important to remember that the Rhodesian forces used to speak in Portuguese, because 
a large number of them were Portuguese-speaking Mozambican blacks, who had fought with 
special commando units of the Portuguese colonial army and had fled to Rhodesia after 
independence.107 Most of these former members of the Portuguese army were used as 
reconnaissance agents (spies) inside Mozambique, roaming roads and railways, getting close 
to military units and defence installations so as to take note of the troops and types of 
weapons used by ZANLA and the new Mozambican army, the Forças Populares de 
Libertação do Moçambique (FPLM), and then sending the intelligence to Rhodesia.108 
The Rhodesian attacks were not only against military targets but also against 
Zimbabwean refugee camps. With the escalation of the struggle inside Rhodesia, 
Mozambique received a large number of refugees. The Mozambican soldiers had the role of 
receiving and protecting them, providing food and helping them to integrate into 
Mozambican communities.109 Because of the massive arrival of Zimbabwean refugees in 
Mozambique, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
and the Mozambican government created refugee camps in Manica, Sofala and Tete. In the 
first years of Mozambique’s independence, the Refugee Services of the Ministry of Interior 
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of Mozambique were in charge of the camps, but authority over them was gradually 
transferred to ZANU.110 The UNHCR provided humanitarian assistance (food, clothes and 
medical care) both to refugees in the camps and to those who spontaneously integrated into 
local host communities. As mentioned above, such camps were also attacked by Rhodesian 
forces. The best-known of those attacks was the massacre of Zimbabwean refugees at 
Nyadzonia camp in August 1976. It is estimated that 618 people were killed and 300 injured 
in that attack.111 The Rhodesian army justified its attacks on refugee camps as a campaign in 
pursuit of ZANLA guerrillas. According to Zengeni, although the Zimbabwean refugee 
camps received civilians, it was there that ZANLA used to recruit new members of their 
guerrilla army.112 Machel considered the Nyadzonia massacre and other Rhodesian incursions 
into Mozambique as aggression not only against ZANLA but against the Mozambican people 
as well.113 In response to Rhodesian attacks, Mozambique wrote memos to the UN Security 
Council highlighting Rhodesian incursions into Mozambique, as a way of calling to 
international attention Rhodesia’s atrocities in Mozambique.114 
But the Frelimo government also took military measures in response to Rhodesian 
attacks. One of these measures was the formation of four military brigades in 1977, with the 
objective of defending Mozambican territory against Rhodesian attacks and also to support 
ZANLA militants. These brigades were stationed in Manica, Tete, Inhambane and Gaza 
provinces. After the Nyadzonia attack, the Mozambican authorities began mobilising and 
recruiting young Mozambicans to join the army and fight alongside ZANLA, with 
compulsory military conscription becoming law in 1978.115 As Samora Machel had justified 
this measure in the third session of the Popular Assembly, ‘the compulsory military law was 
approved as a ways of defend the country from the military attacks and infiltrations of the 
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enemies (the Rhodesian Forces).’116 Thus hosting ZANLA and defending Mozambique’s 
territory and sovereignty became one and the same for Frelimo. 
In order to ensure that the military recruitment process had succeeded, the party-state 
had created a strong coercive machine which was set up from below, led by Dynamising 
Groups (DGs).117 The DGs were in charge of identify and recruit young people from the 
neighbourhood, schools, offices or even intercept public transport (in cooperation with the 
military police) and sent them to the military trains. Indeed, according to Estevão 
Nhacuengue, one of the Youth who was recruited to the compulsory military service in 1978, 
there was a kind of fear to joint to the military service, because the youth were scared of 
being killed. So, as way of avoid that, most of them (including him) were running away and 
hidden themselves from the GDs.118 Abdul Karim, other person who was recruited to the 
military service in 1978, described his experience in that terms: 
 
I was 18 when I was recruited to the military compulsory service. The Chefe de Quarteirão 
(head of residential units) had told me and other young people that we must list ourselves into 
the military service. Once I preferred to continue my studies than to fight, I run away from my 
parents’ house and hidden myself into my grandmother’s house in the village, for almost 30 
days. Suddenly, one day, I went to see my parents at night. The Chefe de Quarteirão found 
out that I was around and called the police, whose captured me and sent me to Boane in order 
to be trained.119 
 
However, beside military attacks and massacres, Rhodesia usedanother aspect to react 
Frelimo’s support for the Zimbabwean liberation struggle by creating of Resistência Nacional 
Moçambicana (Renamo). Renamowas created by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence 
Organisation (CIO) in 1976 as a group that would provide the Rhodesians with information 
about ZANLA bases in Mozambique, gauge the number of ZANLA guerrillas, assess the 
extent of Frelimo support for ZANLA, act as local guides or reconnaissance for the 
Rhodesians and, finally, also carry out attacks designed to undermine the Mozambican 
economy, thereby increasing the costs to Frelimo of supporting ZANLA.120 The Rhodesian 
CIO firstly recruited and incorporated different components to Renamo, such as soldiers who 
deserted from Frelimo’s army before and after Mozambican independence, black 
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Mozambicans who served in the Portuguese counter-insurgency unit and secret police, white 
settlers who lost their privileges after independence, and former Portuguese agents. Many of 
these were extremely bitter towards Frelimo for their loss of status and marginalisation in the 
post-independence period, making them amenable to recruitment.121 The first Renamo 
commander was André Matsangaissa, who fled to Rhodesia in October 1976 after being 
arrested on charges of theft in re-education camps by the Frelimo government. In fact, it is in 
re-education camps that Renamo recruited most of its soldiers, as they usually contained 
many people imprisoned by Frelimo, and most of these prisoners had strong grievances 
against the Frelimo government.122 However, many Renamo militants were also recruited by 
force, and were used to carry food and military material and to serve as guides in their home 
areas.123 
One of the early missions of Renamo was to disrupt ZANLA operations through the 
destruction of bridges and the laying of mines on routes used by ZANLA to get inside 
Rhodesia.124 In addition, Renamo spread propaganda against Frelimo’s leaders and their 
policies and ideology through a radio station called A Voz de Africa Livre(Voice of Free 
Africa). It had a studio and transmission station in Rhodesia and began transmissions in July 
1976.125 Its broadcasts criticised Frelimo for supporting ZANU. A 1977 broadcast titled ‘The 
Opening Note’ justified Rhodesian attacks on Mozambique in the following terms: ‘[i]f today 
Mozambique is attacked by the Rhodesian army, the blame falls solely on Machelists 
themselves, because it is they who provoked the retaliatory attacks by Ian Smith. Every 
responsible government knows perfectly well that if it provokes a foreign country, it has to 
bear the consequences’.126In the same broadcast, Voice of Free Africa generated propaganda 
about why Frelimo was supporting ZANU:  
 
Machel is making use of the Zimbabwean problem to collect some millions of escudos [from 
Mozambican people through the Solidarity Bank], while at the same time it is using 
Mozambican people … We should not forget that Machelism has long been using the 
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Zimbabwean problem as a means of survival, because the irresponsible Machelists are 
incapable of solving the problems of the administration of Mozambique.127 
 
The widespread nature of this kind of propaganda in Mozambique was an effort to undermine 
the Machel government psychologically and encourage anti-Frelimo dissidence.128 In so 
doing, the Rhodesian forces aimed to discourage popular Mozambican support for ZANU. 
Despite the fact that Renamo was created as a Rhodesian counter-insurgency force, it gained 
increasing legitimacy in Mozambique, resulting in its expansion and staging of a devastating 
civil war, which ended only in 1992.129 However, despite the intensification of Rhodesian and 
Renamo attacks, Frelimo did not stop supporting ZANLA. On the contrary, Frelimo tried to 
intensify its military support to ZANLA by sending its forces to fight inside Rhodesia – a 
theme that is taken up in the next section.  
 
Internationalists inside Rhodesia 
In 1977, the Mozambican authorities took the decision to send a group of Mozambican 
soldiers, known as the internationalistas, to the interior of Rhodesia. This operation was 
divided into three phases. In the beginning, a small group of these Frelimo militants went to 
Rhodesia to sabotage and plant mines on the routes used by Rhodesian forces to enter 
Mozambique. Lemos Pontes, was one of the militants who was sent on this initial operation: 
I was trained in Russia in 1976 as a sapper, with the specialty of reconnaissance, sabotage and 
engineering. When I came back at the end of 1976, I was posted to Manica with the mission to 
close the entries and exits of Rhodesian forces, mining roads inside Rhodesia near the 
Mozambican border, then returning to Mozambique. The operation was carried out in 
Penhalonga [Mucumbo], Zonue [Tea state], Mutare district and near Chipinga [Chipinge].130 
The second phase of the Mozambican presence inside Rhodesia also took place in 
1977. The Mozambican authorities sent other groups of soldiers to Rhodesia to conduct 
reconnaissance missions. These groups consisted of five members introduced in each 
ZANLA platoon that entered Rhodesia. Their role was to verify whether the ZANLA 
militants were operating effectively. These militants entered Rhodesia using three principle 
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points: the region of Chicualacuala in Gaza province, Tsetsera in Manica province and 
Mucumbura in Tete province. It is important to point out that this operation was highly 
secret, to the degree that the Frelimo militants sent to Rhodesia were made aware of their 
impending deployment to the neighbouring country only at the last minute, as Zengeni 
elaborated: 
 
I was operating in Chicualacuala when I was called by the headquarters in Maputo. They told 
me that I had to go to the Soviet Union with a group of 20 other militants. However, instead 
of going to the Soviet Union we were sent to Combomune in Gaza. Here we met the brigade’s 
commissar, Mahandjane, who told us that we were going to Rhodesia [instead] with the 
mission to verify what was going on there. My group joined a group of 80 ZANLA militants 
that entered Rhodesia from Chitanga. After crossing the border, we were stationed in Gezani, 
near Lundi river. After one week we went to conduct military operations in Selukwe.131 
 
In this phase, the Mozambican soldiers stayed inside Rhodesia and operated with ZANLA 
militants for a period of six months at a time. After that, they were replaced by another group 
that was also composed of five members. The Mozambican soldiers also acted as military 
advisers to the ZANLA field commanders, as they usually had more war experience than 
their Zimbabwean counterparts.132 
Furthermore, in 1979 Frelimo decided to send Mozambican soldiers to operate 
indefinitely inside Rhodesia. First they sent 340 soldiers and, after five months, a further 160 
were sent to reinforce this group.133 However, to be sent to Rhodesia it was necessary to 
speak one of the languages spoken there.134 Thus most of the soldiers sent to Rhodesia were 
natives of provinces that had a frontier with Rhodesia. They often shared the same languages 
and had relatives in Rhodesia. Zengeni, for example, grew up in Rhodesia between the ages 
of 6 and 17, and he was more fluent in Shona and English than in Portuguese.135 The other 
selection criterion for Frelimo-assisted operations in Rhodesia was war experience. Most of 
the Mozambican soldiers went to Rhodesia as commanders, because they had operated for a 
long time in Frelimo’s struggle against the Portuguese army. One Mozambican soldier who 
fought alongside ZANLA in Rhodesia was Lemos Pontes. Pontes entered Rhodesia through 
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Manica province and operated in Buhera, Charter, Sadza and Mhondoro, and he described the 
beginning of these operations in the following words: 
 
after my operations along the Manica border, I spent three months in Dondo, Sofala province, 
training a group of militants. These militants were coming from the military units that 
operated in the border region between Mozambique and Rhodesia, during 1975–1977. After 
the training, we received General Sebastião Marcos Mabote, the headquarter chief, who told 
us that we were going to be sent on a special mission and he gave us Chimurenga war names. 
My war name was John Hondo. On 29 February, we left Manica at the night until we reached 
Deroi, where we met Josiah Tongogara and a group of 23 ZANLA soldiers. He told us that 
our special mission was to fight alongside ZANLA inside Rhodesia … and that we had to act 
as Zimbabwean people and use our Chimurenga names, so as not to be discovered by 
Rhodesian authorities that we were Mozambicans.136 
 
Frelimo did not want the Rhodesians to discover that there were Mozambicans fighting inside 
Rhodesia, lest the Rhodesians increased their incursions into Mozambique as retaliation. 
From 1979, Frelimo soldiers in Rhodesia assisted ZANLA in laying landmines on the roads 
used by Rhodesian forces, blowing up railway lines and bridges and assaulting their military 
barracks. Mozambican soldiers and ZANLA guerrillas developed a good working 
relationship in the course of these activities because the latter looked up to Mozambican 
soldiers as victorious guerrillas, from whom they had a lot to learn.137 
Despite the proximity between Mozambican and ZANLA militants, some conflicts 
occurred during the war. Most of these were over women. According to Lemos Pontes, 
ZANLA guerrillas did not want their Mozambican colleagues to be involved in relationships 
with local women.138 Pontes explained that there was competition for women between 
ZANLA and Frelimo because Zimbabwean women often preferred the Mozambican soldiers, 
owing to the fact that they treated them with more respect than their Zimbabwean 
colleagues.139 Machel argued that a revolution could never be complete if women continued 
to be oppressed.140 This might lead one to deduce that Frelimo’s seemingly more 
‘enlightened’ view than that of ZANLA on the role of women was respected and actively 
promoted by Frelimo elites. Isabel Casimiro challenges such a deduction by arguing that, 
despite Machel’s rhetoric about women’s emancipation, it was ordinary women themselves 
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who struggled for recognition within Frelimo through the creation of the Destacamento 
Feminino (Female Detachment). In fact, as she points out, before the creation of the Female 
Detachment, the Frelimo militants used to look at women as producers and reproducers and 
source of sexual pleasure to the guerrillas.141 The relationship between women and their male 
counterparts in ZANLA was equally controversial during the liberation struggle. As Fay 
Chung and Josephine Nhongo-Simbanegavi have written, many ZANLA militants, 
particularly the senior commanders, regarded women as objects to control.142 They often 
demanded sexual services from women who joined the liberation struggle. Most women did 
not enter these casual unions willingly, but were forced into them.143 The problem of 
subjugation and exploitation of women was therefore a shared one between Frelimo and 
ZANLA.  
Another source of conflict between Mozambican and ZANLA militants centred on 
military tactics. For example, Pontes explained an episode that caused conflict with ZANLA 
guerrillas in Buhera, in early 1979: 
a group of woman, a Female Detachment carrying war material, camped in Buhera near where 
my platoon was camped. However, a day before, we saw the movement of helicopters, and the 
Mozambican commander advised his platoon and these women to leave because the enemy 
would bomb the area. These women did not accept the advice, and as a consequence were 
bombed and killed by the enemy. ZANLA militants accused Mozambican soldiers of leaving 
these women to die intentionally. This situation created a kind of tension between us … It 
stopped when Tongogara had a meeting with all of us and asked ZANLA to drop the accusation 
because we were innocent.144 
 
The Rhodesian forces, over time, discovered that Frelimo was actively assisting ZANLA, 
fighting inside Rhodesia alongside Zimbabwean guerrillas, after some captured militants 
revealed it to them.145Zengeni, for instance, had to change his war name from Tichatonga to 
Mabhunu Muchampera, after a Rhodesian force captured a Mozambican soldier who revealed 
the names of other Mozambicans operating in the area. But Machel publicly admitted that 
Frelimo soldiers were active in Rhodesia only at the end of 1979, following the signing of 
Zimbabwe’s Lancaster House independence agreement on 21 December. In Machel’s words, 
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‘when Rhodesian forces attacked Mozambique with the excuse of pursuing the Zimbabwean 
liberation movement, they were inviting Mozambique to participate in the struggle for 
Zimbabwe…. And Mozambique accepted the invitation’.146 
In addition to the military backing assessed in this section, Mozambicans also 
rendered other forms of support to ZANLA. The following section will examine how the 
Mozambican civilian population supported ZANLA militants and Zimbabwean refugees. 
 
Ordinary Mozambicans and ZANLA Militants 
The euphoria that characterised the early years of Mozambican independence was perhaps the 
most influential aspect that made Mozambicans embrace Frelimo’s commitment to 
internationalism. Frelimo propagated the notion that Mozambicans could take part in building 
a new international society based on principles of equality and justice. This view can be 
explained by the ways in which Frelimo presented itself to Mozambicans as heroic liberators 
and cast Mozambique’s independence in a universal, humanistic light.147 Thus many 
Mozambicans showed their commitment to Machel’s call to support total southern African 
liberation. In the rural western areas bordering Rhodesia, where most ZANLA bases and 
refugee camps were established, people developed their own mechanisms to support ZANLA 
and Zimbabwean refugees. According to Airessi Jacapu, who was raised and lived in Tete 
province, in Zumbo (Tete province), families shared their homes and machambas (farming 
fields) with Zimbabwean refugees, so that Zimbabweans, rather than being needy refugees, 
could grow their own food.148 These relationships between Mozambican communities and 
Zimbabwean refugees in the border areas were facilitated by the fact that the communities on 
both sides often shared the same language and culture. For these communities, therefore, 
strict borderlines did not exist as such.149 According to Victória Canxixe, who lived in 
Changara district, Tete province, after the liberation struggle started in Rhodesia, many 
Mozambicans and Zimbabweans crossed the border to Mozambique seeking safety. These 
communities had household and family ties on both sides of the border, and people did not 
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use passports to cross from one side to the other; they were crossing the border through 
shortcuts, which took them less than an hour of walking.150 In addition to these cross-border 
family ties, Mozambicans had been migrating to Rhodesia since the 1950s in order to work in 
tea, tobacco and cotton farms, and because Rhodesia offered better opportunities for social 
mobility for migrant Mozambicans, particularly education.151 
However, not all Zimbabwean refugees who crossed the border into Mozambique had 
family ties with local people. Zimbabwean people without relatives in Mozambique tended to 
be hosted in refugee camps. Rural Mozambicans received refugees and then directed them to 
Frelimo forces, who were responsible for screening them in order to ascertain whether they 
were genuine refugees or Rhodesian spies.152 Frelimo also organised local people to act as 
Milícias Popular (local soldiers). These Milícias were given basic military training and small 
arms to defend the local population against Rhodesian attacks.153 João Miranda, who operated 
in Chicualacuala as a miliciano, points out that, as Milícias, they also conducted patrols so as 
to detect the presence of Rhodesian forces inside Mozambique and to provide intelligence.154 
This practice of popular vigilance explains why the Rhodesian forces often disguised 
themselves as Mozambican soldiers when entering Mozambique, draping themselves in the 
Mozambican flag, blackening their white faces with paint and singing Frelimo songs.155 
Rural Mozambicans also transported ZANLA’s materiel and food to specific 
locations, which were generally near the Rhodesian border. These materials were buried in 
spots called matize, from which ZANLA retrieved weapons in small quantities and took them 
into Rhodesia.156 Mozambicans residing along the border also assisted ZANLA in the 
evacuation of wounded guerrillas to their bases in Mozambique. Miranda was involved in 
these evacuation activities, and he recalled that trained local people sometimes gave first aid 
to ZANLA militants who crossed the border with injuries, while others used traditional 
medicine to stop bleeding and fevers. Only after this basic first aid were wounded ZANLA 
fighters evacuated to their bases to receive advanced medical attention.157 Rural 
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Mozambicans who lived in the same areas as ZANLA guerrillas also shared their food and 
water, particularly food that they grew in their machambas, such as cassava, maize and 
watermelon. Fenias Runguane explains that there was a kind of exchange of food in Mapai 
between local people and militants (both ZANLA and FPLM). Most ZANLA militants asked 
for farm products, particularly maize and fruits, and, in exchange, local people received food 
that they did not have access to, such as canned sardines, corned beef, condensed milk and 
biscuits.158 This kind of exchange also characterised the relationship between Zimbabwean 
refugees and host communities. With the intensification of war inside Rhodesia, the flow of 
Zimbabwean refugees increased from 5,000 in 1975 to around 40,000 in 1978.159 Despite the 
support that they received from ordinary Mozambicans and their government, the UNCHR 
and other organisations, there were still food shortages in refugee camps and the diet was low 
in protein content.160 As a way of getting extra food or particular food nutrients, refugees 
adopted a system of barter, called chirenje, in which they exchanged clothes and shoes that 
they received from Scandinavia for particular foodstuffs from local peasants.161 
Although Mozambique supported ZANLA and Zimbabwean refugees in the manifold 
ways described in this article, the country was faced with economic fragility. The massive 
exodus of Portuguese nationals left Mozambique with major shortages of technicians and 
state officials, since only Europeans had been allowed access to higher education during the 
colonial period.162 To add to the difficulties, Mozambique was hit by floods in 1977, which 
left thousands of people without shelter and destroyed productive farms.163 Moreover, 
Mozambique paid a significant economic price from the closure of trade links with Rhodesia 
and from the destruction of infrastructure by Rhodesian forces. As Minter points out, the cost 
of Mozambican sanctions on Rhodesia over 4 years was estimated at over US$500 million, 
more than double Mozambique’s annual exports.164 It is because of these economic realities 
that Frelimo, despite being supportive of ZANU militarily, was always open to the idea of a 
negotiated independence settlement for Rhodesia. Hence Frelimo coerced ZIPA commanders, 
who aimed to complete a total revolution in Rhodesia by military means, to attend the 1976 
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Geneva conference.165 Thereafter, ZANU attended all subsequent internationally mediated 
independence talks. And when Mugabe proved intransigent at the 1979 Lancaster House 
conference, because he preferred military victory to a negotiated settlement, Machel, through 
one of his aides, Fernando Honwana, firmly counselled Mugabe to agree a settlement at 
Lancaster House, because Mozambique could no longer meet the economic costs of hosting 
ZANU.166 Peter Carrington, who chaired the conference, and others in the Rhodesian and 
ZANU delegations credited Frelimo’s intervention as having guaranteed a successful 
conclusion to the Lancaster House talks.167 
 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the views of Frelimo and Mozambicans who aided ZANU in its 
struggle for Zimbabwean independence. I argued that the commitment of Frelimo to support 
ZANU is an indication of its belief in the idea that the independence of Mozambique in 1975 
would not be complete while other southern African countries continued to be under colonial 
rule. Frelimo believed, as the new government of an independent country, that it had a moral 
obligation to support other liberation movements fighting white minority regimes, in the 
same way that Tanzania and Zambia supported Mozambique’s liberation struggle. Thus 
Frelimo intensified its political and military support for ZANU from 1975 by offering 
Mozambique as a territorial base, bequeathing state resources, and engaging in joint military 
operations with ZANLA in Rhodesia. Frelimo’s hosting of ZANLA and its defence of 
Mozambican sovereignty became one and the same. Furthermore, Machel and Nyerere 
instigated the union of ZIPRA and ZANLA to form ZIPA in 1975 and they encouraged the 
formation of the Patriotic Front between ZAPU and ZANU, although lasting unity between 
these groups never materialised. Ordinary Mozambicans in border areas also participated in 
co-operation between Frelimo and ZANLA. Mozambicans provided intelligence on the 
movements of Rhodesian forces, supplied food and helped to transport war materials to the 
Rhodesian border. This supportive relationship between Mozambicans and ZANLA was 
facilitated by shared languages and culture, which even enabled the formation of Frelimo–
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ZANLA military contingents, composed of soldiers who spoke the same languages and who 
could therefore enter Rhodesia and operate together with a measure of unity and 
understanding with the local people. However, the Frelimo–ZANU relationship was not 
without difficulties. Frelimo took an uncooperative approach to relations with ZANU in the 
beginning because it was not a member of the club of ‘authentic’ liberation movements. 
Relations improved, in part because of the above-mentioned sense of solidarity that Frelimo 
held and because ZANU attracted Frelimo’s support through its convincing commitment to 
armed struggle. Other difficulties centred on disagreements over tactics between some 
Frelimo soldiers and ZANLA guerrillas on the Rhodesian war front. Additionally, certain 
ZANLA guerrillas opposed Frelimo soldiers’ intimate relationships with local women in 
Rhodesia.  
 As seen in the case of Frelimo and ZANU, hosts’ influence on liberation movements’ 
internal politics must be seen as shaped by the interests and agency of liberation movements 
themselves. As shown, Mugabe became the leader of ZANU in 1977 against the wishes of 
Frelimo. And Frelimo failed in its efforts to foster unity between ZANU and ZAPU and their 
respective armies. Where hosts wielded decisive authority is the sovereign right to withdraw 
sponsorship on their territory. Using the threat of withdrawal of support, Frelimo ordered 
reluctant ZIPA commanders to attend the 1976 Geneva conference, and influenced Mugabe 
to agree a negotiated independence settlement in 1979. Frelimo took these actions because, 
although it supported ZANLA guerrilla operations, it did not close off the possibility of a 
negotiated independence settlement for Rhodesia owing to the escalating economic costs it 
faced the longer the liberation war went on. 
 
 
 
Chapter II 
‘When the unofficial meets the official’:  
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Introduction 
Cultural manifestation—particularly songs, dance and poetry—have always been present in 
the lives of African people. For being based in oral tradition these African cultural 
manifestations are considered as undefined, evasive and unofficial compared to other official 
cultural expressions.168 
By analysing popular songs, poetry and letters that support the Zimbabwean liberation 
struggle during the revolutionary period in Mozambique, this chapter will look at unofficial 
and poetic vision of history represented by African popular orality169 as well as to ‘map 
people experience’170 in order to understand in which ways the freedom of expression that 
characterise the songs were repressed by Frelimo’s ‘vocabulary of ready-made ideas’, which 
extol Frelimo’s revolutionary ideology. At the same time, I will engage with these song lyrics 
to explore Mozambique’s commitment to the struggle for Zimbabwe. My aim is to explore 
what Penvenne and Sitoe refer to as the role of cultural expressions, which is to project 
images of leadership or of power to the audience, interpret the relationship between the 
leadership/power and the public and, partly informed by the performa’s experience, convey 
aspects of public sentiment back to the leadership or to those who hold power.171 
It is important to refer that the cultural expressions that support Zimbabwean 
liberation movements and its struggle were written and created during a revolutionary period 
in which Frelimo was in the process of building a politically and morally correct ‘new man’. 
Taking this aspect into account, I would like to look at these cultural expressions in order to 
understand in which ways the party-state ideology interfered into the creative process. In 
other words, is there anything that escapes official discourse? Is it possible to recover popular 
voice into these songs, letters and poetry?  
 
Transformation of popular expression in Mozambique 
Songs, Poetry and Letters during Colonial Period 
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Scholars have established the role of culture. Johannes Fabian for example, had defined 
African popular culture as a communicative process in which the society expresses, generates 
and forms its world view, using some kind of independence and creativity.172 
In Mozambique, like other African countries, songs, dances and poetry have been 
used as medium of communication. Nonetheless, there is a clear historical fracture in the 
ways in which people used popular expressions to express themselves. During the colonial 
period for example, there was more creativity, while after independence this process was to a 
large extent controlled by the party-state as a way of shaping an ideological consciousness. 
By exploring songs that used to be sung in Mozambican rural areas during the 
colonial period, particularly Chopi music in the Gaza province and the ‘Paiva’ song in the 
Zambeze valley, Vail and White stress two fundamental aspects about these songs. Firstly, 
the songs worked as a ‘map of people’s experience’ in the sense that they referred to the 
experience of people, and the way it transmitted from generation to generation. Secondly, the 
songs are historically relevant for being licensed by freedom of expression, in which the 
normal conventions between chiefs and workers are violated, because the chiefs could be 
criticised by their followers ‘in ways that the prevailing social and political codes would not 
permit’.173 
In fact, one particular aspect of this period is that Mozambican people used song and 
poetry as a form of complaint about the ill-treatment under the administrator of the 
companies or under Portuguese rule. According to Vail and White, those songs were openly 
critical and a kind of a jeer which rejects injustice; a satire, protest and lament against hunger, 
beating, forced labour and arrests.174But these songs also invoke the relationship of client to 
patron that people had. Through this song, people were not complaining about the legitimacy 
of the patron, who they regarded as the Mbuya, in other words, the great one, protector, 
Lord; They protested and complained about the form of treatment that they received from this 
mbuya, father and protector for whom  and whose rules they must follow .175 
Poetry was also used by Mozambicans to express their feelings about the colonial 
regime, particularly in urban areas. After the establishment of the New State in 1930, and the 
development of several economic infrastructures, the cities attracted many African people to 
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work as cheap labour. This level of development in cities, particularly in the capital, 
Lourenço Marques, was enabled by the existence of an African urban elite.176 What 
distinguished these African elites from the others was a certain academic degree, which gave 
them the possibility to become a black ‘petite bourgeoisie’ or assimilados. According to 
Hedges and Darch, the Instituto Negrófilo was the main channel for the political assimilation 
of the black petite bourgeoisie.177 
It was within these African elites that anti-colonial feeling and nationalists emerged 
and crystallised during the 1950s and 60s.178 Poets like José Craverinha, Noemia de Sousa, 
Rui Nogar and so on, had expressed their feelings within that context, mostly influenced by 
African-American literature and the idea of negritude.179 Their poems were published in the 
Brado Africano and the Itinerário newspaper.180 These poems, like the songs that used to be 
sung in field labour, also complain about Portuguese’s injustice, but also stressed the idea of 
Negritude, o orgulho negro and the desire of being free.  
Noemia de Sousa’s poems like Se me quiseres conhecer (if you want to know me) and 
Let my people go or José Craverinha poems’s, Nossa Voz (our voice) invoke the pride of 
being black: ‘I am not more than a piece of black wood, so please examine me carefully’.181 
At the same time the poems also invoke a kind of revolt against the colonial system and white 
supremacy: ‘familiar images come to me, (...) with tired faces, revolted painful and 
humiliations’;182 or ‘our voices rise (...) over the white egoisms of men’.183 But above all, the 
poems invoke the hope of being free, in their country: ‘its cry swollen with hope184 or and 
them the conquest and new liberate zones free.185 
During the colonial era, Mozambicans rarely used letters to express themselves. That 
can be explained for two reasons. Firstly, by the fact that the colonial state had only promoted 
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and used Portuguese as a written and school language, marginalising in that way African 
languages.186 Secondly, because the press (where people usually published their letters) 
functioned as a way of legitimating the colonial system by, representing the Colonial State 
interests and its ideology.187 Thus, it was difficult for African people to get access to the Press 
and express themselves.  
However, as Fatima Mendonça pointed out, in very low degree the press was also able 
to open some spaces into the emergence of interests divergent from the colonial state.188 One 
particular example of those ‘divergent interests’ is the emergence of the newspaper A Voz 
Africana (The African Voice), a weekly newspaper funded in 1962, in Beira. That Newspaper 
had created a Section Readers in which African people were allowed to send letters.189 
Through those letters, the readers expressed their views about the events in their daily lives 
such as marital and moral issues, oppression situations, and social injustices and so on. 
However, it is important to say that, although the letters were used by the population to talk 
about what was going on in their life, they did not touch on political issues. According to José 
Capela, one of the Editors of the A Voz Africana, this absence of political critique is justified 
by the fact that the letters were written during the 1960s, a period with a very strong degree 
of African politicization.190 
One important aspect of those letters is that they present grammatical mistakes, which 
demonstrates the difficulties that African people had to express themselves in Portuguese, 
taking into account that their background was mostly rooted in orality. So, the decision of the 
A Voz Africana’s editors of not editing the letters, allows us to trace what Maria Suriano 
pointed out as one function of the letters, which is to show the ways of constructing and 
performing identities at the same time that allows us to see how people constructed their 
citizenship.191 
However, with the advent of nationalism, songs, letters and poetry started to present 
other forms. They no longer critiqued or satirized the colonial regime; rather, they started 
working in service of an ideological programme. In other words, the unofficial that 
characterised popular songs and poetry during colonial period started to represent the official 
after Mozambique independence.  
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The Liberation Struggle and the Birth of a New Vocabulary  
The liberation movement, Frelimo, was funded in 1962 under the leadership of Eduardo 
Mondlane. In 1964 it started the liberation struggle against the colonial government. During 
the first years the war, Frelimo was busy dealing with military organisation, education and 
health network in the liberation areas, more than cultural issues.192 Culture became an urgent 
issue to the liberation movement only after the internal crisis within FRELIMO in 1968-69, 
soon after Eduardo Mondlane is death. Thus, culture started to be used as weapon of combat: 
an instrument of military unity, as well as a way of exalting the Frelimo struggle and its 
revolutionary ideology of building a new nation.193 
However, it was only in 1971 that the new form of poetry and song were openly 
defined during the 1st seminar of culture. This seminar defined the character of the poetry and 
songs. It was especially stressed that poetry and songs should be inspired by the practice of 
the liberation struggle. At the same time the seminar condemned poetry without revolutionary 
meaning, such as love poems or poems that invoke abstract meanings, and also stressed that 
the poet had to be involved in the liberation struggle and adopted Frelimo’s ideology.194 So, 
in order to become revolutionary, song and poetry started to present what Maria Benedita 
Basto calls a ‘vocabulary of ready-made ideas’, composed by Frelimo’s tropes, in which 
there are a proliferation of watchwords such as ‘nationalist’, ‘revolutionary’, ‘victory’, 
‘heroes’, ‘enemy’ and ‘traitors’. In this sense, poems like the first one above, for example, 
had changed to second one: 
 
Poema Moçambicano Mozambican poem 
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Eu sinto o som do tambor 
(...)  
Outra vez eu sinto o som do tambor 
Rugir, rugir como o som do leão no zoo 
Dizer me coisas passadas 
De Matibzana valente temido 
vejo então meus cabelos curtos de negro 
I hear the sound of the drum 
(...)  
One more time, I hear the sound of the drum 
Roar, roar as the lion’s sound at the zoo 
Telling me past things 
Of the brave Matibzana feared 
And I see my negro’s short hairs 
 
Quero Lutar I want to fight 
(...) 
Ainda quero sentir 
O metralhar roquejante 
Das balas                                                    
Que sibilam as matas de Moçambique 
Quero sentir o sangue encarnado 
Escorrer pelo solo pátrio 
Avermelhando Terra amada 
E cuspir bala de fogo 
Matar inimigo do Povo 
(...) 
I still want to feel 
The rocking of machine gun 
Of bullets 
That hiss the forest of Mozambique 
I want to feel the crimson blood 
Flowing down the homeland’s soil 
Reddening the beloved country 
And spit fireball 
Kill the enemy of people 
Thus, phrases that invoke the desire and the pride of being black and the spirit of the 
ancestries—’the Matibzana brave and feared’; the African symbols—’roar of the 
Leon’;195and certain phrase that shows some kind of anger about white people—’Then I see 
my hard feet, trampling the body of white people’, that used to characterise poetry, were 
replaced by phrases that stress the revolutionary ideology, such as: ‘kill the enemy of 
people’— not white people anymore;’ that hiss the forest of Mozambique’, as a whole and 
not ‘the Matibzana homeland’ as it was before revolution. In fact, the reference to traditional 
authority and the African values were regarded by Frelimo not as good things (boas coisas), 
because they invoke African traditions that Frelimo considered as obscurantist and tribalist.196 
The reference to racial discrimination also was condemned by Frelimo ideology, which 
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always made clear that the war was not against white people, but against Salazar’s colonial 
regime.197 Not only the poems changed the style in order to fit into the new vocabulary of 
ready-made ideas, but Frelimo also prohibited the use of heteronyms, because during the 
revolution process people had nothing to hide like in the colonial period.198 
Indeed, with the revolution, songs and poetry had to sing the Frelimo anthems that 
exalted the military saga. Those poems were published in gazettes and newspapers, such as 
25de Setembro, Os Heroicos, etc.199 In the words of Mario Malyamungu, ‘the songs started 
singing the Frelimo laws (the fame of the party), things that exist, not abstract anymore’.200 
The following Frelimo’s popular anthem is an example: 
 
 
Mozambique nossa Terra Bendita 
 
Mozambique our blessed land 
Moçambique, nossa terra bendita 
Hoje luta pela liberdade 
Nos queremos a nossa liberdade 
Unidade a todo o país 
Sangue do povo triunfante 
Vencerá o regime de Salazar  
A Frelimo sairá vitoriosa  
Nesta luta pela liberdade  
A sagrada bandeira da Frelimo 
Flutuará nas nossas fortalezas 
Mozambique, our blessed land 
Today fights for freedom 
We want our freedom 
Unity in the whole country 
And the blood of the triumphing People 
Will win Salazarʼs regime 
Frelimo will come out victorious 
In this struggle for freedom 
Frelimoʼs sacred flag 
Will wave in our fortresses. 
Basically, the lyrics of the song and poetry concentrate upon three main aspects. Firstly, the 
songs extol the role of guerrilla in the liberation struggle (those who suffered in the war). 
Take for instance this Makonde song: 
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Marching and miracles  
Mwenu madyoko mukulumwikiʼ ambi 
Wetu nelo tunammyimyangidya 
Patushitenda ingʼondo yetu ʻkuno 
ku-Moshambiki 
You, kids that grew up now 
Today we remind-you-the-history 
Of when we were doing our war, here in 
Mozambique 
Patushitenda ingʼondo yetu 
Tuvenentete tundipata tabu 
Yakuwena shilo na mui a-materiale 
Tushindapangana kupagwa mashepi 
Mwatupita kulamulanila 
Tushindawika kubalabala ku-kutenda          
gʼondo 
When we were doing our war We-the-People, 
we suffered 
Walking day and night with [war] materials 
We organised ourselves, to have chiefs 
That went around command 
We went to the roads to make                                                                                                          
War 
 
According to Paolo Israel, one the most important icons of Frelimo’s songs was the long 
marches of the people carrying war materials.201 By stressing the role of the guerrilla, 
Frelimo's new vocabulary of ready-made ideas wanted to make Mozambican people know 
the difficulties and the suffering that the guerrilla had to face: the hunger, thirst and even the 
imminent death in the field battle, during the liberation war.  
The other aspect that songs and poetry stress is the denunciation of traitors. An 
example of this kind of song is the famous ‘Frelimo Aina Mwisho’, a song that sings the 
names of the Frelimo’s traitors:  
 
 
Frelimo aina mwisho Frelimo is infinite 
Ukabanga vandakuduma If you are wicked, they will punish you 
Simango reaccionário Simango is a reactionary 
Nkavandame anditukuta Nkavandame fled 
Joana reaccionária Joana is a reactionary 
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The third aspect was to extol the role of the leaders, the heroes who fought against 
colonialism, like this Makonde song about Mondlane (the first Frelimo president). 
 
Mondlane                                                               
Wakubyaite wako 
Vanu vamalambi 
Twala 
Makalatashi lao 
Andika 
Lina lya-Mondlane 
Andika 
Lina lya-maimyo 
Mondlane 
Those who killed you 
These people are scoundrels 
Take  
Your posters 
Write 
The name of Mondlane  
Write 
The name of History 
 
As the song stresses, the name of Mondlane, the hero who was killed by scoundrels, is the 
name of history. Indeed, with the independence of Mozambique in 1975, Frelimo had brought 
all their experience from the struggle to the newborn country. In fact, as Borges Coelho 
stressed, the experience in the liberation areas had a very important and central role into the 
political and life after independence, not only as a past that reverberated but also as the 
reference and light to the future.202 
 
Shaping the official discourse  
Pierre Bourdieu defends that language can function as an instrument of power. As he 
explains, the power of the language is expressed by exercising violence through ideology, as 
well as by the manipulation of language. The manipulation of language in turn, is expressed 
by a power given to the speak men, who uses words to make people believe in his vision of 
world.203 However, ‘what creates the power of words is the belief in the legitimacy of words 
and those who utter then’; In other words, in politics ‘to say is to do’, because it is possible to 
get people believe that you can do what you say and make them recognise your vision.204 One 
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of the most powerful ways of making people believe what you say is through political 
speeches and mass mobilisation. Charles Cells argues that speeches and mass mobilisation 
are very important to increase political consciousness, change the way of thinking and act as 
well as to mobilize people for some efforts and recognise your vision.205 
Frelimo used speeches at the crowed rallies and mass mobilisation as main device to 
instil its revolutionary ideology as well as the idea of supporting the Zimbabwean liberation 
struggle. In fact, speeches and mass mobilisation were considered very important weapons 
during the revolutionary process206, particularly in countries like Mozambique, where by the 
time of independence, about 90% of people were illiterate. The independence of Mozambique 
in 1975 gave Frelimo a carte blanche to build a revolutionary country guided by Marxism-
Leninism. That process had started with the Triumphal Journey, Viagem Triunfal from 
Rovuma to Maputo, in which Samora Machel presented himself and Frelimo’s ideology to 
the Mozambicans through crowed rallies accompanied by his long speeches as well as started 
the process of building the new nation composed by morally correct new-man, the man from 
whom was required to abandon the old colonial behaviour and follow Frelimo’s ideology.207 
Four massive rallies to instil Frelimo’s ideology of supporting Zimbabwean liberation 
struggle took place in Maputo. The very first one took place in 3 February 1976, at the Praça 
dos Herois (the Heroes Square), and around 50 thousand people attended it. This rally had 
three main objectives: to celebrate and create the day of the Mozambican heroes; to celebrate 
the changing of the name of Mozambique’s capital from Lourenço Marques to Maputo; and 
also to define the lines of supporting the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe. In the rally Samora 
Machel announced the creation of the Solidarity Bank, to which every Mozambican was 
required to contribute one day of their salary, as a way of supporting the liberation struggles 
around the world, particularly the Zimbabwean one, and also the victims of natural disasters 
in Mozambique.208 
At this rally, Samora Machel used a rhetorical framework in order to mobilise the 
population to support the Zimbabwean struggle. One of the most important aspects that 
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Machel underlined in his speech, as way of persuade Mozambicans to support the 
Zimbabwean liberation struggle was the reference to the support that Frelimo had received 
from other countries during liberation struggle, in the following words:  
 
Our independence was possible because of our determination and the clarity of our objectives. 
But also thanks to the international solidarity of socialist countries that supported us with 
medicines, weapons and clothes (...). Tanzanian people are so poor, more poor than you (...) 
but they are able to say that without independence of other countries, our Independence does 
not have significance This is a big lesson to the Mozambicans. Let act like them, (...). And 
we, that are free now, what we are going to do for others? What will be our contribution? 
People have to contribute, find ways of supporting Zimbabwean (as well as South African 
people).209 
 
 
By exalting the role of international solidarity that supported Frelimo’s liberation 
struggle and making questions to the audience such as ‘what we going to do? Which will be 
our contributions?’, and then himself answer the questions, Machel was publicly demarcating 
his position to the large audience, while at the same time he was making an effort to coerce 
and persuaded people.210. Indeed, by using these kind of language devices, Machel was doing 
what Krebs and Jackson define as rhetorical coercion through speeches or discourse, which 
occurs when the audience are left without access to the rhetorical material to contest or refuse 
the speaker’s words.211 
One month after this rally, precisely in 3 March 1976 Samora Machel communicated 
to the people Frelimo’s decision to close frontiers with Southern Rhodesia. One week after, in 
13 March, the party-state organised a massive march in the street of the capital Maputo, 
which culminated with a big rally, at the campo de Sporting (now Campo de Maxaquene). 
According to Tempo magazine, around a hundred thousand people attended this rally. Its 
objective was to welcome Samora Machel’s decision to close the borders with Rhodesia, as 
well as to show that Mozambicans accepted and were willing to support the Zimbabwean 
struggle.212 In this rally, members of civil society – such as the Youth organisation, 
Organização da Juventude Moçambicana (OJM), Military organisation, Forças Populares de 
Libertação de Moçambique, (FPLM ), the ‘Dynamising Group’, the workers organisation and 
the Women organisation, Organizaçao da Mulher Moçambique (OMM) – read messages, in 
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which they committed themselves to support the Zimbabwean struggle and Frelimo’s 
decision.213 It is important to mention that those civil society organisations belonged to the 
Frelimo framework. In fact, during the revolutionary period, Frelimo only allowed social and 
political organisations controlled by the party-state, and suppressed every political and social 
organisation outside its own emanations, by accusing them of representing the enemy.214 
Thus, the civil organisations that were at the massive march and rally were no more than the 
party-state itself representing the population. In so doing the party-sate was exercising 
populism in Ernesto Laclau’s definition, in which there is a symbolic unification of the group 
around an individual, the charismatic leaders and their decisions.215 
The other massive rally took place at Praça dos Herois, Heroes’ Square, on 3 July of 
1976. The objective of this rally was to condemn the attacks of the Rhodesian forces in 
Mozambique. Basically, in this rally Samora Machel wanted to instil into the people the idea 
of reacting to the Rhodesian forces attacks as well as to tell them the ways in which they 
could do it. As his speech claimed: 
 
‘What we could do to answer those massacres and attacks? Reinforce our defensive capacity. 
The FPLM (and ZANU) must strengthen their relationship with the people in order to 
combine the modern weapons and the traditional one. During the war, we killed the enemy 
with arrows and traps. Those traps that kill rabbits and gazelles, they also serve to kill the 
enemy. So, we must push Ian Smith to our organised people. Our armed people...’216 
 
 
Once again, Samora Machel used the experience of Frelimo’s liberation war to deal with 
issues after independence and also to persuade people to support his ideas. As Darch and 
Hedges pointed out, ‘Samora Machel worked hard to construct a narrative that both recounts 
the history of Frelimo’s liberation struggle, and accounts for the nature of the enemy, in 
offering persuasive reasons for accepting and supporting his and Frelimo’s ideas, polices and 
legitimate the future wielders of state power.’217 In other words, people had to use this 
particular Frelimo’s experience of killing the enemy during liberation struggle, to support 
Zimbabwean struggle, particularly the Zimbabwean militants and FPLM. 
The last crowed rally took place at the Praça da Independência, the Independence 
Square, on 23 December 1979. According to Rádio Moçambique’s news report, thousands of 
                                                          
213 Ibid 
214 B. Machava, ‘State Discourse on Internal Security and the Politics of Punishment in Post-Independence 
Mozambique, 1975-1983’, Journal of Southern Africa Studies, 37,3, (2011) 
215 E. Laclau, Critique of Populist Reason (London, Verso, 2005), p.100 
216 ‘Comício Popular de Apoio ao Zimbabwe’, Rádio Moçambique, 3 July 1976  
217
 Darch and Hedges, ‘Political Rhetoric’, p. 57 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
51 
 
people attended the rally. That time, Samora Machel wanted to celebrate with Mozambicans 
the Lancaster House agreement as well as to announce that Mozambique would reopen the 
border with Rhodesia. At the same time that he did the balance of the human, material and 
economic damage caused by Rhodesian forces in Mozambique.218 
An important aspect about the rallies was the number of people who attended them. It 
is important to stress that the participation of people was compulsory. In the dates of the 
rallies, the party-state used to grant a day off from work, Tolerância de ponto. The party-state 
also used to organise public transport to collect people in the Maputo and Matola areas.219 
Moreover, the policemen used go from house to house to make sure people were going to the 
rallies , and making sure that no one would leaving the venue of the rally after it finished.220 
 
The meeting of the unofficial and the official  
 
After independence, the revolutionary songs were taken from the battle field and liberated 
zones to the newborn nation, while the party-state began to instil the new required formal 
characteristic of songs and poems. The call for proposal for the National Anthem can be seen 
as a mirror of how Frelimo wanted the songs and poetry to be, during the revolutionary 
process.  
Indeed, the new Mozambique’s National Anthem started by presenting Frelimo’s 
tropes and its heroic process, by underlining that it was thanks to Frelimo, as liberation 
movement that Mozambique achieved freedom—’Long Live Frelimo/Guide of the 
Mozambican people’, who had—’Overthrown colonials’. However, the National Anthem 
also lists the emotive symbol of nationalist ideology, by presenting the Frelimo’s slogans (the 
palavras de ordem) —Like Viva Viva a Frelimo; by extolling the role of the military 
aspect— ‘Heroic people that with arms in hands/Overthrew colonials’; by using Frelimo 
tropes like—’From Rovuma to Maputo’, which remember the triumphal journey of Samora 
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Machel; and also by stressing that the struggle will continue—’The struggle against 
imperialism/Continues and will always win’.221 
In 1977, Frelimo realised the first national meeting of culture after independence. The 
main objective of this meeting was to officially define the role of culture in the revolutionary 
process.222 It was defined that culture had to be national, popular and revolutionary, by 
working as a weapon to liberate man from colonial capitalist.223 In other words, culture has to 
be based on the experience of the liberation struggle by affirming as nation not tribal and by 
struggling against traditional mentality and inequality.  
Cultural manifestations were also one of the forms that Mozambicans used to support 
the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. If in the rural areas people had engaged directly with 
ZANU militants and Zimbabwean refugees, as we saw in the first chapter, in the urban areas 
people used poetry, letter and songs to do so. Most of these poems and letters were published 
in press articles in the readers section, particularly at the Notícias newspaper and weekly 
Magazine, Tempo. The songs were sung at the school, during political or cultural meetings 
and during celebration dates. Most of these songs were recorded at Rádio Mozambique 
studios in Maputo. One important aspect is the role of choral songs, particularly at schools, 
the place where an educational agenda was enforced to instil revolutionary and political 
consciousness to the young students.224 
The euphoria that characterised the first years of independence was expressed in the 
daily life of Mozambique. Mozambican people had to embraced Frelimo’s idea that 
independence was only possible because some ‘precious’ young boys and girls had sacrificed 
their life in the bush, in order to liberate all Mozambicans. Thus, it was their turn to support 
other liberation movements as a form of retribution to the support that Mozambican had from 
other people, but also as way of completing their own sovereignty. The fact that 
Mozambicans had experienced a colonial regime based on racial discrimination reinforced 
the idea of supporting the Zimbabwean liberation struggle as the fulfillment of a moral duty. 
As we had explored in the first chapter, this identification was stressed by the cross-border 
family ties as well as the historical, economic and cultural relationship between Zimbabwean 
and Mozambican people. 
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So, the cultural expressions, letters, songs and poetry that supported the Zimbabwean 
liberation struggle stressed three principles aspects: The moral support to the Zimbabwean 
struggle; the using of armed struggle to defeat the enemy; and finally satire against Rhodesia 
and the figure of Ian Smith.  
 
Moral support 
The first aspect that those cultural manifestations express is the moral support to the guerrilla 
and Zimbabwean people. Let us consider the following poems, published in Tempo magazine: 
 
 
Uma lágrima caindo livre neste mundo  
 
A tear falling free in this world 
Este poema é uma lágrima caindo livre 
nestePoema-pronto  
Para ti, irmão Zimbabwe  
Este é uma amálgama de letras  
E sentimento de um homem oprimido 
This poetry is a tear falling free in this world 
Ready-Poem 
For you, Zimbabwe brother 
This is a amalgamation of words 
It is the feeling of an oppressed man 
Poema-canto 
Por ti, Zimbabweano  
Este poema é arma  
Vivendo a dor  
De um povo forte  
Poema-luta  
Por ti, irmão oprimido  
Song-Poem 
For you, Zimbabwean 
This Poem is a weapon 
Living the pain 
Of a strong people 
Struggle-Poem 
For you, my oppressed brother 
 
 
Irmão Zimbabweano venceremos My Zimbabwean brother, we will win 
Olha mas não chores 
Para estes corpos indefesos 
Que caem metralhados 
Por gritar a liberdade 
Look but don’t cry 
To those defenseless bodies 
Mown down by the machine-guns 
For crying out for freedom 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
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Olha mas não chores 
Para esta ponte deflagrada 
Por este rio tornado sangue 
Por esses que dizem não a tua liberdade 
Don’t cry 
At this blown-up bridge 
At the river turned into blood 
By those who refused your freedom 
Venha meu irmão 
E olha para esses  lacaio 
Que a soldo do imperialismo 
Destroem sem piedade 
Mas com ansiedade 
Recordam grandes fortunas 
Mas não chores 
Porque a luta continua 
E a morte nunca trava  
A determinação do povo 
Que lutam pela liberdade  
Venceremos 
Come my brother 
And look to those lackeys 
That paid by imperialism 
Destroy without mercy 
But anxiously  
Remember big fortunes 
But don’t cry 
Because the struggle continues 
And death never slows down  
The determination of the people 
Who struggle for freedom 
We will win 
 
Looking at the poems, we indeed see some kind of creativity that characterises the process of 
writing: by using figures of speech, such as ‘this poetry is a tear falling free in this world or 
the river became blood’, and also by bring to the poems sounds and tone that give rhythm and 
musicality, for example, ‘ready-poem’, ‘song-poem’ and ‘struggle-poem’ at the beginning of 
each poem’s strophe. Nonetheless, this creativity is invaded by the vocabulary of ready-made 
ideas that constrains the revolutionary cultural expressions. In fact, we can see that there are 
proliferations of Frelimo tropes such as: ‘oppression, imperialism, the struggle continue, 
determination of People (povo), freedom and Zimbabwean brother’. That Frelimo’s tropes 
made the poems above fit into the revolutionary ideology that speaks about concrete aspect 
not abstract, as the seminary of culture had defined in 1971. 
These poems also present what Borges Coelho calls the ‘triumphalist vision’ of the 
past which characteristices Frelimo’s narrative, providing a picture full of certainty of the 
victory as final destination.225 —by using phrases that stressed the idea of victory, such as 
‘the struggle for freedom and we will win’. Indeed, by morally supporting Zimbabwean 
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brothers, Mozambicans were hoping that like Frelimo did during liberation war, Zimbabwean 
liberation movements would also win. 
Songs also stressed this moral support to the Zimbabwean struggle and the idea of 
victory. Take for instance, this changana song: 
  
Povo Zimbabweano vai vencer People of Zimbabwe will win 
Tiyisela Zimbabwe, u ta kota ku hlula 
nalaoo   
 
A valala va helile ku tiko dza Africa 
 
Smith o salisela ku tiko dza Africa 
 
Hold on Zimbabwe in order to beat  
The enemy 
 
The other enemy was finished in Africa 
 
Smith is saying goodbye to Africa 
 
 
This song also presents the ‘triumphalist vision of Frelimo’, by asking Zimbabwean militants 
to ‘hold on the struggle in order to beat the enemy, because as other colonial regime or enemy 
was finished in Africa, Ian Smith also would fail. An important aspect is the presence of 
formulas, in which poems and songs present repetition of words groups and phrases such as, 
‘hold on Zimbabwe in order to win the enemy, the other enemy was finished in Africa, Smith 
is saying goodbye to Africa which were repeated three times into the song. In fact, as Vail 
and White defend, those formulas are useful to the poet/compositor to compose his work in 
performance.226 
However, moral support also functioned as mobilising device for Mozambicans 
support Zimbabwean liberation struggle. That was more present in letters rather than in songs 
and poems, as we can see in the following letter: 
 
Mozambican Youth 
For 500 years the people of Mozambique were under foreign domination, facing years of massacres 
and oppression under Portuguese colony. Then, young people decided to take weapons to become free 
from the colonial yoke and fight against exploration of man by man. And also erase completely the 
vestiges inherited from the fascist regime of Caetano and Salazar. Young people had an important role 
in the struggle. They struggled to win the power of the workers and peasants and create a 
revolutionary mentality toward the popular masses. We must be solidarity with people of the others 
African countries, who are still struggling for freedom. We have to support the just struggle of 
Zimbabwe. We young people must be consciousness and organised to defense our sovereignty and 
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became vigilant to prevent the enemy actions in our country. To finish, I would like to send for all of 
you, from Rovuma to Maputo, my revolutionary greetings. The struggle continues.227 
 
Apart from describing the Frelimo’s saga marked by 500 years of domination, massacres and 
oppressions, this letter also justifies why Mozambican people had to support the Zimbabwe 
struggle. Like songs and poems, letters also use Frelimo’s words that fit into the vocabulary 
of the ready-made ideas, such as: ‘massacres and oppression’, ‘exploration of man by man’, 
‘power of the workers and peasants’, ‘vigilance’, ‘enemy’, ‘from Rovuma to Maputo’, 
‘revolutionary greetings’ (saudações revolucionárias) and the ‘struggle continues’. In fact, 
according to Frelimo’s saga, the history of Mozambique is divided in two periods: The 
colonial one, marked by ‘domination’, ‘massacres’, ‘oppression’, ‘exploration’, ‘enemy’; and 
the revolutionary one, that gave ‘power to workers and peasants’, ‘sovereignty’ and built a 
nation ‘from Rovuma to Maputo’. The revolutionary period also brought the idea of justice, 
‘revolutionary mentality to the popular masses’ and also the support to ‘just causes’, like the 
Zimbabwean struggle. 
One important aspect in those cultural expressions is the reference to massacres. It 
could be explained by the fact that Frelimo had his liberation struggle codified by a big 
narrative, which symbolically started with colonial aggression, the Mueda massacre.228 
 
 
The military aspect 
The second aspect that Mozambican poetry, letters and songs extol are the role of the military 
effort, leading to victory. Like Frelimo’s revolution songs, the marches of soldiers were also 
an important icons of cultural expressions that support the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. 
See for instance the poems below:  
 
Para vós irmãos combatantes do 
Zimbabwe 
For you fighting Zimbabwean brother 
 
Povo do Zimbabwe,Povo do Zimbabwe 
 
 
People of Zimbabwe, People of Zimbabwe 
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Povo do Zimbabwe, Povo de Zimbabwe 
Es tu que es chamado para pegar em armas 
E defenderes a tua pátria 
E alcançares a vitória final 
 
Povo do Zimbabwe, Povo do Zimbabwe  
Que em 1965 foste apunhalado  
Na tua hora da liberdade  
Por um punhado de colonialistas racistas 
 
Povo do Zimbabwe, Povo do Zimbabwe              
Já chegou a hora da liberdade 
Com a tua arma liquidarás o regime racista 
Com a tua enxada e livro liquidarão a fome 
E o obscuratismo 
 
Povo do Zimbabwe, Povo do Zimbabwe  
O poder popular esta próximo 
Apoia aquele que debaixo da chuva  
Rasteja a procura do inimigo 
 
Povo do Zimbabwe, Povo do Zimbabwe 
Africa chama por ti povo 
A liberdade te convida 
Para a tua glória final 
 
Povo do Zimbabwe, Povo do Zimbabwe  
O mundo livre e progressista 
Te ajudará 
A marchar em honra do teu sangue 
Derramado nas tuas horas dificis 
 
Povo do Zimbabwe, Povo do Zimbabwe 
People of Zimbabwe, People of Zimbabwe 
You are called to pick up the gun  
And defend your country  
And achieve final victory 
 
People of Zimbabwe, People of Zimbabwe 
In 1965, you were stabbed 
At the time of your freedom 
By a handful of racists colonials 
 
People of Zimbabwe, People of Zimbabwe 
It is now time for freedom 
With your guns you will eliminate racism 
With hoes and book, you will eliminate hunger 
And obscurantism 
 
People of Zimbabwe, People of Zimbabwe 
The popular power is close at hand 
Support those who in the rain 
Crawl in search of the enemy 
 
People of Zimbabwe, People of Zimbabwe 
Africa is calling you 
Freedom is calling you 
To your final glory 
 
People of Zimbabwe, People of Zimbabwe 
The free and progressive world will   
Help you 
To march in honor of the blood 
You’re shed during the hard times 
 
People of Zimbabwe, People of Zimbabwe 
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A luta será sempre dura e prolongada 
Para melhor definição do inimigo 
E para um avanço vitorioso 
Viva a luta justa do povo 
do Zimbabwe 
Luta continua 
 
The struggle will always hard and long 
To better define who is the enemy 
And to a victories advance 
Long live the just struggle of the people  
Of Zimbabwe 
The struggle continues 
  
 
 
Avante irmão do Zimbabwe Advance Zimbabwean brother 
Tu, Irmão Zimbabweano 
O dia- a-dia é teu para avançares  
Avante, irmaõ Zimbabweano   
A tua luta é a luta da Africa Inteira 
 Africa 
Avante, Irmão Zimbabweano  
You, my Zimbabwean brother 
The everyday is yours to advance 
Advance, Zimbabwean brother 
Your struggle, is the struggle of the whole of 
Africa 
Advance, Zimbabwean brother 
Zimbabweano, irmão meu zimbabweano 
Em cada dia que nasce 
Uma vitctória deve nascer também 
No teu campo de batalha 
Zimbabwean, Zimbabwean brother 
On each day that is born 
One victory must be born also in your 
 Battle field 
Zimbabweano, irmão meu zimbabweano  
Em cada dia que nasce 
Uma vitctória deve nascer também 
No teu campo de batalha 
Com toda Africa ao teu lado 
Avança irmão Zimbabweano 
Avança e será vitorioso  
Zimbabwean, Zimbabwean brother 
On each day  
That is born in your 
Battle field 
With all Africa with you/ in your side 
Advance, Zimbabwean brother 
Advance and you will win 
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As forças dos que morrem pelos  
Massacres 
Opressão, escravidão e assassinatos 
Deve ser a energia aceleradora do 
Seu combante  
Deve ser uma inspiração no teu 
Campo de batalha 
Para derrubar, demantelar o regime  
Illegal do Ian Smith  
The strength of those who die for the 
Massacres 
Oppression, slavery and murder 
Must be the accelerating energy of Your 
combat 
Must be a inspiration in your  
Battle field 
To knock down and dismantle the illegal 
Regime of Ian Smith 
O conhecido tabaqueiro, responsável pelo bando colonialista na Rodesia do Sul 
The known as ‘tabaqueiro’ (tabacco man), responsible for the pack of colonialist in South 
Rhodesia229 
 
 
It is clear that Mozambican people had learnt through Frelimo’s saga that victory was made 
in the battle field. It is the mythology of soldiers who ‘picked up the guns and defend the 
country’ that would bring the victory and freedom. And as the poems shows, that freedom 
needed sacrifice from the soldiers who in the ‘rain, crawl in the search for the enemy’. So, as 
Frelimo did during its liberation struggle, Zimbabwe must do and obviously, win. In fact, the 
Frelimo myth is relating to amazing journeys of people, ‘walking hundred kilometers through 
thick bushes, marshes, hills and rivers’,230 carrying war materials in the encounter with death.  
The fact that Mozambican people stress this military aspect as one of the ways in which the 
Zimbabwean militants would win, it is explained in part by the fact that, as Penvennne and 
Sitoe pointed out, the public euphoria of Frelimo’s victory and the pride of independence 
made Mozambicans people develop a feeling of national identity and national pride.231 
 The military aspect had also produced heroes at the battle field, those who accepted to 
die for freedom. As this poem shows: 
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Zimbabwe Zimbabwe 
Nao chores criança! 
Que o teu pai respondeu ao apelo da 
revolução 
Don’t cry child 
Because your father answered the call of 
revolution 
Pegou na sua espigangarda para que  
Tu possas viver como um homen   
Foi matar os que vivem à custa do 
Nosso sangue  
He picked up the guns 
For you to live as a man 
He went kill those who live  
Of our blood 
Não estejas triste meu filho! 
Que o seu pai recusou-se a ser 
Pisado 
Limpa as lágrimas 
E prepara-te para pegar a tua arma 
Quando ele cair  
E para continuar a Gloriosa luta  
Até a vitória  
Don´t be sad my son  
Your father didn’t want to be stepped  
on 
Wipe those tears away 
Prepare yourself to pick up your weapon 
When he falls 
And to continue the glorious struggle 
Until final victory 
Não chores criança  
Sorri  
Don’t cry child 
Smile 
 
As Paolo Israel points out, Samora Machel’s theory of revolution was based on a starch 
dichotomy between heroes and enemy.232 So, according to the poem above, it was necessary 
for a child to know that the revolution is made by those who ‘picked up the guns’, the 
soldiers (heroes) ‘and goes kill those who lives of our blood’, the enemy. It was also clear 
that those heroes would also ‘fall in the battle field’, so, the child must prepare himself ‘to 
pick up your gun and continue the glorious struggle’. 
Samora Machel had explained the role of the heroes in his speech in the following 
terms:  
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‘Heroes are all those who always dedicated to serve the people (povo), those who died during 
the liberation struggle. But also are heroes those who nowadays, in the different levels, with 
courage, determination resist the defeatist ideas and maneuvers of the enemy.233 (...) let us 
support Zimbabwe, we have to accept die alongside the Zimbabwean militants, for African 
dignity, for revolution, for respect of the man as human being. (...). We want FPLM to die 
with honor... their death had to have power. Not as the death of those who had light death like 
chicken, run down on the road by drunkenness.234 
 
It seems that Samora Machel’s words had touch Arnaldo Virgilo Bila, who wrote a letter to 
Tempo, offering himself to die as a hero to liberate Zimbabwe: 
‘Mozambican Comrades, compatriots! This is the time for us to stop sleeping because the 
cock crowed; that cock is comrade Samora Machel. As you know, when the cock crows it 
means that day had dawned. (…). I am 35, head of a family and father of 6 children but I say 
to all Mozambicans that I offer myself voluntarily to support the struggle for Zimbabwe. 
Mozambicans! Many people died in Tanzania and Zambia in order for us to become 
independent. So we should also die to liberate Zimbabwe from our common enemy (…) so I 
leave here my appeal to all Mozambicans in order to be attentive to the government’s calls to 
support our Zimbabwean brothers… The African struggle against colonialism, imperialism, 
exploitation, humiliation and oppression continues.’235 
 
In his speeches, Samora Machel used the vocabulary of ready-made ideas in form of slogans 
or palavras de ordem. Those slogans were used by Samora Machel at the beginning and at 
the end of speeches or meetings. Slogans reflect in the letters, such as ‘down with 
colonialism’, ‘imperialism, exploration, humiliation and oppression’, as well as ‘down with 
domination’ ‘long life the just struggle of Zimbabwe’, ‘live the people of Zimbabwe’, ‘down 
Ian Smith’, were used as palavras de ordem of supporting Zimbabwean cause and have 
invaded the cultural expression in support of the Zimbabwean struggle. It can be explained by 
the fact the palavras de ordem employ a kind of linguistic conditioning for the audience 
emotional impact.236 Indeed, as Darch and Hedges argue, Samora Machel used palavras de 
ordem as an assertive technique to persuade and coerce the audience, by requiring listeners to 
repeat them during the speeches.237 
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The use of those watchwords in letters, songs and poems, also stressed the functions 
of the slogans within the coercive ideological framework, at two levels. At one level, by 
knowing and using those slogans, people were able to show that they belonged to the patriotic 
group that Frelimo was building. And at the second level, it was used as disciplinary device 
to reinforce support for a specific political line and denounces enemies (of the Zimbabwean 
struggle in our case).238 For instance, thousand of Jeovah’s witnesses were arrested in 
October 1975, because they used to refuse swearing the national flags and Frelimo’s 
slogans.239 
The aspect of belonging to the group, ‘the patriotic and revolutionary Mozambican’, 
was also expressed by the word People (povo), which was frequently used to referring both 
Mozambicans and Zimbabweans. According to Maria Benedita Basto, the word people, 
‘short-circuits the process of identity building that was in conformity with the Marxism-
Leninist canon’.240 Through this Marxism canon, Frelimo was attempt to ‘define, mold and 
purity the new society of its own dirt and excesses’.241  In order to achieve that, the party-
state launched campaigns against the reactionaries, those who inherited the viciousness of 
colonialisms and also traitors of people’s cause.242 So, people who did not support the 
Zimbabwean struggle were also within the reactionary framework. 
 
Satire and insulting of Ian Smith 
 
The third aspect of these cultural expressions, much more present in songs than in other 
cultural expressions, is a kind of satire, insult and jokes to Ian Smith and his regime. 
According to Karin Barber, songs and jokes may be the principal channel of communication 
for people who are denied access to the official media. What is more, those kinds of jokes 
and satire circulate with greater rapidity than other kind of cultural manifestation.243 It seems 
that musicians also used song to spreading the messages of supporting Zimbabwe, by 
satirising Ian Smith, calling him pejorative names like ‘rabid dog, insane, tobacco man, 
vagabond, criminal and idiot’, as in the following songs: 
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Smith wa Hlanha Smith is crazy 
Smith wa hlanha, vanduweno 
Wa lhanha, wa hlanha  
Smith wa kaya kaya, va nduweno 
Smith wa pepuka, vanduweno 
Wa pepuka le Rodesia 
Nambi loku a ti edja angwazi 
Anga toloveli Moçambique 
Smith is insane my friends 
He is insane, he is insane 
He is insane, he is insane in my friends 
Smith is crazy my friends  
He is going wild in Rhodesia 
He thinks he is strong 
But he better not challenge Mozambique 
 
However, once again, those pejorative words also fit into Frelimo’s tropes, particularly into 
the words of Samora Machel, who said in the following speech: 
 
‘The doctors have already diagnostic that Ian Smith is crazy. He is a crazy man who does not 
become better with electric shocks (...) But the treatment of this animal is in Mozambique, 
every countries had already condemned this illegal regime (...). 
Ian Smith is a dog with rabies. The rabid dog objective is kill people. He does not have 
treatment. I don’t know if a Vet knows how to cure him, I don’t know. But when a dog has 
rabies, the solution is to kill him. That is the treatment. 
(...) We cannot accept slavery anymore; we refused the slavery of the Portuguese colony, so 
we will not accept the slavery of this tabaqueiro.244 
 
 
As we can see, the songs reproduce almost literally Samora Machel’s words, by repeating 
phrases such as Smith is a ‘vagabond, criminal, tabaqueiro, rabid dog’ without cure.  
The difference in language is also mist aspect of these cultural expressions. As we can 
see, the first song of the above examples is sung in Portuguese, the official language in 
Mozambique, which means that the meaning of the lyrics could be understood by people who 
lived in different parts of the country. The second one is sung in Changana, language that is 
spoken in the south of Mozambique. Although this aspect reveales a quality that Frelimo was 
trying to downplay— a quality of celebrating ethnicity245 —it seems that when the songs 
underline Frelimo’s ideas, this is not condemned. In fact, Alexandre Langa was signing to 
largely Changana people, most of whom are illiterate and could not speak Portuguese. That 
allowed most people in the South to understand the message of supporting Zimbabwe. 
                                                          
244 ‘Samora Machel’s speech, Comício Popular De Apoio ao Zimbabwe’, Rádio Moçambique, 3 July 1976  
245
 See Penvenne and Sitoi, ‘Power, Poets and the People’ p.61 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
64 
 
Not only the lyrics of the songs fit into the vocabulary of the ready-made ideas by presenting 
Frelimo’s tropes and watchwords that symbolise the revolutionary ideology, but also by 
presenting a kind of disdain for the enemy, who can be easily vanquished by the heroes. 
Indeed, the discourse of Samora Machel also underlined that the best thing that Mozambique 
could do to support the ‘just struggle of Zimbabwe’ was to reinforce popular power, giving 
the people weapons to fight and kill the ‘vagabond’246 The lyrics of the following songs 
underline exactly that: 
 
Bassopa Ian Smith Be Careful Ian Smith 
Pfula mahlu moçambicano 
U lavisa nala waku                                                 
Pfula malho, moçambicano 
U lavissa, Ian Smith  
Leswi, a yentxaka swone                                               
O yini?A ningenile 
A Ku yini? Wa balesela 
Kuve kambe, awa hi hlasela hima bomba 
 
Wene, tatana, wene, mamana,                                
Wene djaha, na  wene, nwanhana 
Tamelani a xi bamo, hi mu hlongolisa 
 
Basopa Ian Smith                                                    
Wena u ni xipfukelana 
Basopa, basopa 
Machel a ta kuba a nompfu                                    
hita ku dlaya 
Kaunda ata ku khava antraku 
hitaku dlayahi ku tuanana 
 
Basopa, basopa, basopa                                        
Nyerere ataku ba a tihlu 
Hita ku dlaya                                                         
Tseretse a ta ku khava khurhihita ku dlaya hi 
ku twanana 
 
Basopa, vafana va Zimbabwe 
Basopa a vana va tiku, 
Hita ku dlaya                                                            
Munhama ya swibamu swaku 
Va ta ku dlaya                                                        
Open eyes Mozambicans 
And look at the bad one                                                                                     
Open eyes Mozambican 
And look at Ian Smith 
Look at what he is doing 
What is he doing? He invaded us 
What is he doing? He is firing at us 
He also throws bombs 
 
You Sir, you madam,  
You young boy and you young girl 
Take a weapon and lets run with him 
 
Be careful Ian Smith 
You have been provoking us                                                                                       
Be careful, careful, careful 
Machel will beat your nose 
We will kill you 
Kaunda going to kick your ass  
We are going to kill in cooperation 
 
Be careful, careful, careful 
Nyerere is going to beat your eyes 
We will kill you 
Seretse is going to kick your stomach  
We are going to kill you in co-operation 
 
Be careful with Zimbabwean’s guys 
Be careful with the son’s of the country 
We will kill you 
The bad things of your weapons 
They will kill you 
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According to the lyrics of this song, Smith had to be careful because he would be beaten and 
killed, not only by Zimbabwean militants, but by the co-operation between Machel, Nyerere, 
Kaunda and Seretse.247 This song is an allusion to the role of the Front line in the process of 
supporting the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. The funny thing is the use of satire and jokes, 
‘Machel will beat your nose’, ‘Kaunda going to kick your ass’, ‘Nyerere is going to beat your 
eyes’, ‘Seretse is going to kick your stomach’. In so doing, people were also trying to recover 
the kind of songs that used to be sung before independence, which used to use satire, joke and 
insulting the colonial regime.248 At the same time that they stress Frelimo’s that the history of 
liberation struggle had to be always glorious, perfect and victorious.249 
In order to fit in the vocabulary of ready-made ideas, most of the songs were sung in a 
new revolution rhythm, Makwayela, a musical genre composed for singing and dance. 
According to Israel Makwayela became an important cultural activity for young students in 
Frelimo’s school during liberation struggle, and after independence it became national 
school-dance and the major forms of transmission of party’s slogans.250 The choice of 
Makwayela as revolutionary song-dance was sustained by two aspects, as Carlos Cardoso had 
argued. Firstly, its origins in South African mines, where the ‘Magaissa’251 used to sing 
against ill-treatment that they received in the ‘compounds’ (mines), gave to the party-state 
some kind credential to use it as revolutionary. Secondly, it was used to stress the party-state 
idea of national unity. Indeed, although Makwayela was originally sung in the South of 
Mozambique, by being sung in all parts of Mozambique, it functioned as a weapon against 
tribalism and regionalism that Frelimo was struggling against. In other words, Makwayela 
was extolling Frelimo’s idea of unity from the Rovuma to the Maputo.252 Makwayela was 
also used to spread Frelimo’s idea of women emancipation. In fact, this singing-dance rhythm 
that originally was performed only by men, started to incorporate women as well. It suggests 
that people were putting in practice the idea of women emancipation.253 
One particular aspect is that Makwayela became one of the most popular rhythms in 
Mozambique, taking the place of Marrabenta, which was more popular than Makwayela in 
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the South. During the colonial period, Marrabenta was the most popular African music in 
Maputo, to the point of appealing to the urban white class. However, because of the 
incorporation of white people and also for its sensuality dance, Marrebenta was prohibited 
after independence, considered by the party-state as anti-revolutionary and morally 
corruptive.254 
However, in spite all those aspects that made the songs that support Zimbabwean 
liberation struggle fit into the coercive ideology framework, differently to letters and poems, 
songs try to experiment with some kind of expressive freedom, as this one shows: 
 
Smith wa Hlanha                                                   Smith is crazy 
Smith wa hlanha, Smith wa hlanha impela 
Smith wa hlanha, impela wa hlanha 
A lorha na a tamele bolhela la guala 
Smith i xidakua, Smith wa hlanha impelaSmith 
wa hlanha, impela wa hlanha 
A lorha na a tamele, bolhela la guala 
Smith wa Pepuka, impela wa hlanha 
Smith wa hlanha, impela wa hlanha 
A lorha na a tamele, bolhela la gualaSmith, wa 
dakua, impela wa dakua 
Smith i xidakua, impela i xidakua 
Smith is crazy, Smith is really crazy 
Smith is crazy, Smith is really crazy 
He sleeps leaning on his drinking bottle 
Smith is drunk, Smith is really crazy 
Smith is crazy, Smith is really crazy 
He dreams leaning in a bottle of alcohol 
Smith is insane/mad, he is really crazy 
Smith is crazy, Smith is really crazy 
He dreams leaning in a bottle of alcohol  
Smith is a drunken guy  
Smith is a drunken guy, he is really drunk 
 
Although the song repeats Samora Machel’s words of satire Ian Smith, ‘insane, crazy’, this 
Xichangana song also presents some kind of freedom and creativity, through the striking 
image of: ‘a drunken guy, who dreams leaning on a bottle of alcohol’. This can be explained 
by what Karen Barber defends as the specificity of oral literature in African popular culture, 
in which there is a difference between written expressions (for example poems and letters) 
and oral expressions (for example songs). As she argues, oral literature in African popular 
culture has to be read as genre, which is composed by a vast stock of materials: formulas, 
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stories, poetic idioms.255 That explains why songs that support Zimbabwe incorporated 
‘different social and historical articulations’.256 On contrast, writing expressions fits in what 
she calls, the ‘intertextuality’ by sharing codes with other texts and (discourses).257 
The other particular aspect is that song (letters and poems) sung in Portuguese fit 
more into the vocabulary of the ready-made ideas than the Xichangana one, for example. So, 
the fact that people were using African languages, which are basically oral and not an official 
written, gave them a space to use some kind of creativity to not follow the official discourse.  
 
Conclusion 
During the colonial period, songs and poetry were used by Mozambican people to complain 
and protest against colonial injustice as well as satirize some important individuals. The 
songs in particular used to be sung in local languages and were transmitted from generation 
to generation. Some songs were composed by professional musicians and performed in 
orchestras. Although those songs were sung in different African languages (such as Chopi, 
Makonde and Chuabo) and touched on various aspects, all of them had as central theme the 
critique of the colonial regime. 
However, during the liberation struggle Frelimo used songs and poetry to shape 
political and ideological consciousness. This interference in the creative process made that 
the songs and poetry changed their nature. Thus, the unofficial expressions started to extol the 
officially agenda. The cultural expressions no longer served to complain against a political 
system, but on the contrary reinforced the political system, by fitting into the vocabulary of 
the ready-made ideas, which sustained the political regime and its ideology.  
Looking at the cultural expression that support Zimbabwean liberation struggle, it is possible 
see two angles: the unofficial aspect, based in freedom of expression and creativity and also 
the official influence on this creative process. Nevertheless, it is difficult to recover a pure 
social consciousness, because the separation between spontaneous support and the influence 
of Frelimo's political discourse is not clear. Indeed, these cultural expressions were invaded 
by the new vocabulary of the ready-made ideas. Songs, letters and poetry presented 
expressions that extol the revolutionary ideology of building the new man. Even when the 
support to Zimbabwean liberation was motivated by moral duty, the songs, letters and poetry 
                                                          
255 K. Barber, ‘Yoruba Oriki and Deconstructive Criticism’, Research in African Literatures, 15, 4, Special Issue 
on Oral Poetry and Song, (winter, 1984), pp. 490-511.  
256 Ibid 
257 Ibid  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
68 
 
had to use Frelimo’s revolutionary tropes, as well as underline the experience of the 
Frelimo’s liberation struggle, that is, the role of heroes, the sacrifice of the soldiers, the 
determination of the liberation movement, and also the final and glorious victory. It means 
that during the revolution, everything including the cultural expressions, which usually 
represent freedom and creativity, had to work within Frelimo’s ideological framework. That 
is to say, people had to show that they believe and belong to the morally correct men that the 
party-state was building, and not to the enemy of the revolution. 
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Chapter III 
Xiconhoca: the saboteurs of the Zimbabwean struggle  
 
Introduction  
The independence of Mozambique allowed Frelimo to take over the country and rule it 
according to its policy and ideology. The Frelimo policy was based on what Young and Hall, 
calls the ‘purification vision’, in which the party-state wanted do purify and clean the new 
society for all the impurity acquired during the colonialism, such as the vices of alcohol, 
drugs and the imitation of western style of dress.258 That explains why Frelimo’s 
revolutionary process of building the nation was based on the idea of defining the correct 
man, the new man, the pure one and eliminating from society the enemy of the revolution, the 
impure one. James Brennam considers it as a characteristic of socialist ideology which uses a 
politic of enmity to look at the enemies of the nation, at the same time that creates 
corresponding pure categories.259 By using the figure of enemy, the party-state was doing 
what Tobias Kelly and Shakira Thiranagama explain as the role of traitors in the process of 
building a nation, which is to expand the authority of the regimes in power and established 
what is correct and what is not within the society.260 
One of the ways that Frelimo used to clean and purify the society was through the 
definition of the enemy of the revolutionary, known as the internal enemy (o inimigo 
interno). This enemy was represented by the cartoon figure of Xiconhoca, ‘the 
personification of evil’ which embodies all the negative aspects and behaviour that were 
undermining Frelimo’s ideology of building the morally correct new man.261 These negative 
aspects and behaviour could be political, social or ideological. As Benedito Machava argues, 
the party-state used the figure of Xiconhoca to ‘map his power and mark the boundaries of its 
citizenship’.262 
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This chapter discusses the ways in which the cartoon figure of Xiconhoca was used by 
the party-state as a visual medium to support the struggle for Zimbabwe. I argue that the 
image of Xiconhoca was used by Frelimo as a visual form to spread the message of solidarity 
to Zimbabwean liberation movements, to ideologically control the adherence of Mozambican 
people to the support of Zimbabwean liberation struggle as well as political propaganda 
against the regime of Ian Smith in Rhodesia. 
 
Xiconhoca and its visual meaning  
The image of Xiconhoca comes up as one mechanism that the government found to ensure 
the support to Zimbabwean liberation struggle. Created by Departamento de Informação e 
Propaganda da Frelimo (Frelimo’s Office of Mass communication) in 1976, Xiconhoca 
became the most famous cartoon in Mozambique and was published in newspapers, 
magazine features, murals, posters and through radio messages. The Xiconhoca cartoon was 
skillfully designed to convey and represent its social, political and ideological message.263 
His messages identified viciousness that Frelimo considered as coming from the colonialism 
such as: laziness, alcoholism, prostitution, polygamy, religious fanaticism, corruptions, 
support for imperialisms, and so on.  
The name of Xiconhoca was drawn from two words: Xico and Nhoca. Xico feio was a 
famous and disgusting agent of the colonial secret police, Polícia Internancional e de Defesa 
do Estado (PIDE). Nhoca means snake in nearly all Mozambican languages. So ‘Xico the 
snake’ is a combination of the ‘conqueror’s spy with folklore imagery of stealth, poison and 
looking danger’.264 According to Lars Buur, the Xiconhoca figure was used to support 
Frelimo’s revolutionary project because it was through the public condemnation and 
repression of the traitors and enemies that the regime legitimated itself.265 
By using the cartoon figure of Xiconhoca as visual medium to support the struggle for 
Zimbabwe, the party-state was doing what Patricia Hayes considers as the ways that the 
exteriority has to invade the emotional sphere.266 In other words, the visualisation of the 
image could be able of invade people’s mind at the point of making them absorb the 
messages transmitted or even change their own ideas. Drawn in black and white, Xiconhoca 
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represents an ugly person, dirty and badly dressed with very big mouth, nose, hear and eyes. 
The carton figure was often accompanied by Frelimo’s revolutionary slogans and short 
speeches in balloons. In fact, Xiconhoca was designed to reach and encourage 
communication among illiterate people.267 Indeed, the combination of simple graphic 
technique, popular language and short text in cartoons work as a form of political propaganda 
in order to consciously reach people with low literacy.268 That is to say, cartoons grant to the 
viewers an access to visual image even without much intellectual skills.269 For Nancy Rose 
Hunt, the use of image and words in cartoon figures could go much further because the 
images by themselves are weak and susceptible of different interpretations. So, the text more 
than being used as a supplement of the images, brings to the cartoons specificities that exceed 
even the words270 
One of the most a popular uses of cartoons in Africa is for political effects. As Daniel 
Hammett defines, political cartoons function as ‘a window onto experience of people’ which 
use them to resist, oppose and challenge the political power and its authority.271 For Achille 
Mbembe, the use of satire as well as the ridicule of the leaders or ‘the autocrat’ as a way of 
challenge the leadership power, is facilitated by the characteristic of the cartons, which use 
the figure of speech to narrating, describing and representing the reality. And also for the fact 
that cartoons have a particular way of persuade, provoke suffering and laughter at the same 
time.272 
 However, differently to the other Political cartoons, the Xiconhoca one was used by 
Frelimo not to challenge the leaders but as a way of ensuring the party-state power and 
shapes its ideology.  
Xiconhoca and the support to Zimbabwe 
To the party-state the process of supporting the Zimbabwean liberation struggle was facing 
obstacles imposed by the external enemy (Rhodesia and South Africa backed and supported 
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by the imperialism) in collaboration with the internal enemy, Xiconhoca, who used to 
sabotage the decision of the government.  
One of those decisions was the creation of the Solidarity Bank in February 1976. The 
bank was created with the objective of collecting funds to support the liberation struggle in 
Southern Africa, in particular Zimbabwean liberation movements as well as Zimbabwean 
refugees. These funds came from one day’s salary in which every working Mozambican was 
expected to contribute to support the liberation struggle. These funds were also channeled to 
help refugees and victims of natural disasters.273 As soon as the Bank was created, Notícias 
newspaper published the comic image of Xiconhoca, in which he refuses to contribute to 
Solidarity Bank and support the Zimbabwean struggle, because he is not interested in the 
process of revolution and internationalism (the word that the government used to define the 
support that was given to the liberation movements of Southern Africa). In contrast, he 
prefers to support the regime of Ian Smith.  
 
 
 
Source: Jornal Notícias, 4 Feburary 1976 
 
By using the image of Xiconhoca, the government wanted to stigmatise and repress all those 
who did not contribute to the Solidarity Bank, which means that they were enemies of the 
revolution and did not have compassion for other people. In so doing, the party-state wanted 
to ideologically coerce everyone who thought as Xiconhoca to join the support for the 
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struggle for Zimbabwe. Indeed, as Paula Meneses argues, the ethical and political messages 
that this figure of Xiconhoca brought were transformed in the behaviour to avoid within the 
revolutionary process of building the new society.274 
Visually, the image above shows Xiconhoca’s behaviour and dress in a way that the 
New State was trying to eliminate, since its represented the colonial behaviour. Frantz Fanon 
explains this ‘colonial’ influence into the African people as the effects of ‘violence’ exercised 
by the colonial governments. According to him, this violence was exercised by destroying the 
indigenous social fabric, lifestyles, traditions, and modes of dress.275 So, in order to fit into 
the western view, the colonised started to present what he calls ‘indigence and immoral 
depravity’, in which African people began imitating the costumes of the colonies as well as 
their tradition and myths.276 
In order to erase this colonial ‘violence’, Frelimo aimed to purify the society from 
what it considers ‘the colonial vices’. Samora Machel publically explained and condemned 
these behaviours into a rally in 1976, using the following words: 
 
The colonial system disseminated a kind of recreation based on consumption of alcohol, 
drugs, sexual promiscuity, putting aside the national culture and blinding imitation of the 
decant values of bourgeoisie (...). In fact, young people appeared dressed in extravagant 
clothes like shoes in the ‘Beatles’ style, trousers that goes until the pectoral, shirt that not 
reach the navel and windbreakers with symbols of the imperialist forces.277 
 
As we can see through the image, all things that Samora Machel condemned in his discourse 
were represented by Xiconhoca: dressed in bell bottoms trousers, belt with large buckle, big 
and attention-grabbing watches, high heeled shoes, ostentation of money and drinking 
several alcohol bottles. The presence of alcohol bottle in the image of Xiconhoca was one of 
the most representative and frequent images. To Samora Machel alcohol was one of the 
most dangerous aspects of Xiconhoca, as he explained at a rally with Caminhos de Ferro’s 
workers (railway workers) in Beira: 
 
To increase our production, we have to liquidate indiscipline into all the sections of 
production. We have to liquidate those who come late at the work. Arriving late at 
work means to sabotage the economy of the country. (…) some people come drunk 
and provoke disturbances. They ruin the machines. That’s why we do not make our 
lives better… in so doing we are opening a very big pit to bury our economy. 
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Because of the indiscipline and some Xiconhocas that come to work drunk. Who 
must smash the Xicos Nhocas? Who? You! Who knows the Xico Nhocas? You! 
Where does Xiconhoca live? He lives here with you. Where they are in that 
moment? They are here. É ou não é (it is true or not) 278 
 
So, the image of Xiconhoca with bottles of alcohol represents a strong symbol of the moral 
degradation, in which a man neglects his responsibility as community member and head of 
family to pursue his on pleasure.279 At the same time he prefers to intoxicate himself than to 
participate in the process of building the nation.280 
To the party-state, the vice of alcohol was one of the bad things that Mozambicans 
carried from the colonial period. In fact, the colonial government had created laws and 
strategies that perpetuated the consumption of alcohol in particularly Portuguese wines. 
Called Vinho para Preto (wine for Negroes), these wines had very bad quality with high 
levels of alcohol and sugar.281 According to José Capela, the exportation of the bad quality 
wine to the colonies was relating to the necessity that the colonial government had to 
allocate Portuguese products into a cheap and easy market.282 
On the other side, to Frelimo the way of dress imitating the western culture 
represents the influence that colonialism and imperialism had on Mozambicans citizens, 
aspect that the new cosmopolitan order was combating by considering as negative and 
morally corruptive. To Thomas Burgess, this condemnation was also part into of the struggle 
between Eastern socialist ideology and the colonial and Western imperialism order 283 
Thus, this visual image of Xiconhoca was showing how those who did not follow the 
orders used to act and dress. The combination of symbol and social commentaries (the 
spoken and unspoken word) was a kind of deviance used by Frelimo to make people 
understand the political and social message into one simple visual form.284 Indeed, according 
to Ritu Khanduri, caricature and cartoons reinforce the aspect of the visual sense through the 
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‘play of exaggeration and likeness, at the same time that stimulate people’s political 
knowledge.’285 
As I have said in the first chapter, although Frelimo was feeling victorious and 
triumphant with Mozambique independence, they were still holding on to the idea that 
independence would not be complete while Mozambique was still surrounded by hostile 
regimes like Rhodesia and South Africa. Frelimo believed that those external enemies would 
use the internal enemies, the Xiconhoca, as its agents to destroy the new nation. The frequent 
use of the slogan A Luta Continua (‘the struggle continues’) meant that even with the victory 
against the Portuguese regime the battle against the imperialism would continue, because the 
Frelimo’s hostile regimes would use economic sabotage and military incursions to discredit 
socialism and revolution.286` 
With the beginning of political and military tension with Rhodesia by 1976, the party-
state started to use the cartoon figure of Xiconhoca to publicly condemn all those who were 
supporting these military incursions inside Mozambique, as these two images show:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:Source:Departamento do Trabalho ideológico do partido Frelimo 
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Figure 2. Source: Notícias, 29 January 1979 
 
 
The first image shows a fat Xiconhoca with a very big stomach, dressed with torn pants and 
carrying a bottle of alcohol in his pocket and expressing his happiness in an intimate 
conversation with his bosses. One of his bosses is imperialism, represented by a very big man 
with his pockets full of money (to pay all Xiconhoca’s actions), who ensures his support to 
Xiconhoca actions. The other boss is Ian Smith who is represented behind imperialism, but a 
little bit smaller. This shows that for Frelimo military incursions and actions of the Rhodesia 
inside Mozambique were backed by the imperialism, the big boss. Yet, by showing Ian Smith 
armed with war material (weapons, napalm, guns, bullets and knives), the party-state was 
making clear how Xiconhoca, the betrayer of the revolution, was supported by imperialism to 
kill people and sabotage the nation. This obsession with imperialism, according to Morier-
Genoud, is part of Marxist conspiracy theory, which sees and blames imperialism for 
everything that happens.287 To Yussuf Adam, this conspiracy theory of blaming all those who 
challenged the government and consider them as traitors, disloyal, infiltrates, agents of 
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They want to destroy the gains of our 
revolution. Their aim is to prove that Socialism 
is bad 
Yes, thanks to FRELIMO the land is ours 
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all. We´re no longer exploited. Imperialism 
cannot accept that 
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International 
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imperialism and colonialism, and so on, was used by Frelimo as an excuse to justify the 
party-state’s mistakes and delusions. 288 
The second image of Xiconhoca condemns the military aggression perpetuated by 
Rhodesia inside Mozambique, at the same time that it extols the role of Frelimo in the 
process of building the new society that brought health, education, and justice to all 
Mozambicans. This image also shows Xiconhoca feeling demoralized by the behaviour of 
other Mozambicans, who were supporting Frelimo’s ideology against the regime of Ian 
Smith.  
Differently to other people who dress according to Frelimo new order, that is, decent 
trousers and shirt, Xiconhoca sits in a dirty place, with torn pants and as always, drinking 
alcohol. To Frelimo that dirty Xiconhoca represents the parasite (parasita), a marginal person 
and an improdutivo (unproductive person), which the party-state was trying to remove from 
the cities. Indeed, with independence the number of people living in cities had grown to about 
250.000 habitants from 1976-1980.289 This exodus of people from the rural areas to the urban 
areas was relating to the following particular reasons, as Carlos Quembo pointed out. First, it 
seems that rural people were not happy with the party-state’s policy that forced them to 
abandon their family field and be relocated to communal villages (or aldeias comunais).290 
Second, the reduction of number of workers in South Africa imposed by the Apartheid 
government made that those workers started to looking for jobs in the cities, at the same time 
that they were trying found ways to go back to South Africa. The last aspect is relating to the 
nationalisation (nacionalizações) of the buildings in 1975, which allowed people who used to 
live in cities neighbourhoods or even in the rural areas to take up the space left by the 
Portuguese, who had run away from Mozambique right after independence.291 So, the 
Xiconhoca with poor personal hygiene was much relating to the urban vagrant who went to 
the city to drink, prostitute, commit crimes or even work as the enemy of the revolution and 
supporting Ian Smith (in our case). With this dualism of representing Xiconhoca in different 
ways, sometime as alcoholic and dirty one, and on other hand as fancy and well dressed man, 
                                                          
288 Y. Adam, Escapar aos Dentes do Corcodilo e cair na Boca do Leopardo, Trajectória de Moçambique Pós-
colonial, (1975-1990) (Maputo, Colecção Identidade, 2006), p. 2-34 
289 C.Quembo, Poder do Poder. Operação Produção e a Invenção dos Improdutivos Urbanos no Moçambique 
Socialista, 1983-198 (Maputo, Alcance Editores, 2017), p.35-36 
290 The Communal Villages were created by the Party-state soon after independence, as the places where people 
could be concentrated in order to benefit from State’s social infrastructures like schools and hospital, and where 
people could produce communally into the machambas (farms). More details about Communal Villages see for 
example, Paolo Israel, In the Step With the Times: Mapiko Masquerades in Mozambique (Athens, Ohio Press, 
2014), p. 167-168 
291
 Ibid, p.37-38 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
78 
 
with clean suits or even fashionable clothes, the party-state wanted to make clear that 
Xiconhoca could be found everywhere in society, within urban vagrancy or even the smartest 
and well-dressed urban elite.  
The other aspect about Xiconhoca is the language. It seems that people who were 
following the party-state orders tend to use the Frelimo’s language in daily conversation. So, 
more than looking at Frelimo as a ‘saviour’ which ‘brought the land to the people’, the 
discourse of the people into the image present words such as ‘revolutions, exploited by the 
imperialism, defend of our revolution’, and so on, that fit into the vocabulary of made-ready 
ideas that I have explored in the second chapter. 
The use of the cartoon figure of Xiconhoca to extol the Frelimo ideology and 
condemn the action of Rhodesia and all those who supported them, can be explained as what 
Khanduri defines as the role that cartoons have, which is to persuade people like photographs 
and films, at the same time that they show ‘their ability to configure empathy that redraws the 
lines of belonging’.292 So, everyone who realised that his idea and action was the same as the 
behaviour of this evil and ugly image of Xiconhoca, would feel psychologically persuaded to 
change their minds and, in this case, join the support of the Zimbabwean liberation struggle.  
 
The propaganda against Ian Smith and political punishment  
In parallel to the idea of using Xiconhoca to spread the message of solidarity to the 
Zimbabwean struggle and ideologically control this support, Frelimo also used Xiconhoca to 
make propaganda against the political changes inside Rhodesia, as this image shows: 
 
 
              Source: Jornal Notícias, 6 May 1979 
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Are you Muzorewa? Yes, Boss 
Smith already explained everything. 
He told me to work with you because 
you are a good boy. 
Hello, hello. Xico? Listen: Do 
you know that now I am the 
master. But do not worry because 
there are not changes in the 
programme.  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
79 
 
 
After the internal settlement agreement assigned by Ian Smith, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, 
Ndabaningi Sithole and Jeremiah Chirau on 3 March 1978, and subsequent election with 
universal suffrage in April 1979, there was a change in the political scene of Rhodesia. 
Bisohp Muzerewa won the election and became Prime Minister of what they called 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, and his party ANC won more than 64%, around 51 of 72 seats destined 
for blacks in the parliament.293 
As a way of showing their disagreement with the election process of Muzorewa, the 
party-state used the image of Xiconhoca to make propaganda against it. In fact, Frelimo (and 
other Frontline leaders) saw Muzorewa as an agent of Ian Smith, who won power to maintain 
the ideals of the white minority in Rhodesia. Frelimo’s disagreement with Muzorewa election 
also leaned on the fact that the party-state was worried with the possibility of international 
recognition for Muzorewa and the ANC as the legal leader of Zimbabwe, which would put 
ZANU-Patriotic Front (the liberation movements that Frontline leaders were supporting) 
outside the government and consequently increase the escalation of military incursions inside 
Mozambique.294 
Indeed, the image satirizes Muzorewa’s election showing a telephonic conversation 
between Muzorewa and Xiconhoca, in which Muzorewa informs Xiconhoca (his ally in 
Mozambique) that he was the new ‘master’ and that he would continue working within the 
same agenda as Ian Smith did. Xiconhoca in turn, underlined that he would continue 
supporting Muzorewa, as Ian Smith (the boss) told him to do. The image is also full of visual 
details, like the file folders that contain letters received from Voster (representing the 
Apartheid Regime), which support Frelimo’s idea that Muzorewa was under Smith and South 
Africa rules, and also the Xiconhoca’s correspondence. On the other hand, in the wall of 
Xiconhoca Office we can see, besides the bottle of alcohol, a rosary, which indexes religious 
fanaticism (another vice that Frelimo wanted to eliminate), as well as a piece of paper which 
shows ‘The Recruitment Programme’ of group of people, the so called reactionaries, such as 
thug, drugged people, PIDEs agents, and so on, in order to join him and support Rhodesia. As 
Will Munzenberg argues ‘the visual image has an indispensable and outstanding means of 
propaganda in the revolutionary context, because of his special effect on the human eyes that 
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makes people see the image and reflected it in their brain without forcing their mind’. Yet, 
the visual image has also a political effect, which can ‘influence the politically naive reader in 
any way chosen by the political rules’.295 
However, Xiconhoca was also used to institutionalise the image of the traitor and also 
to show the consequences of being against the revolution as the following image 
demonstrates: 
 
 
 
Source: Notícias, 11 March 1979 
 
 
The image shows Xiconhoca about to be lynched by the population, by the fact of being 
against the revolutionary process. Through this image, the party-state is showing to all 
Mozambicans the risk of being punished through revolutionary justice for acting like the 
imperialist enemies that compromises the revolutionary process that Frelimo was building.296 
To the party-state those who acted against revolution were seen as traitors, internal agents, 
lackeys of imperialism, reactionary, and anti-revolutionary, among other labels.297 So, 
because of their behaviour, the ‘traitors’ were easily detected and neutralised by the People’s 
Vigilance Groups (Grupos de Vigilância Popular) that worked in collaboration with the 
national intelligence service, known as SNASP.298 However, according to SNASP’s 
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He is imperialism and 
Simth’s agent. He is the 
enemy of our 
independence. He is the 
killer of our people. So, 
now we will apply to him 
revolutionary justice 
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guidelines the Grupo de Vigilância Popular tasks should go much further, as the following 
words show:  
 
The action of the Grupos de Vigilância Popular is not only to detect and neutralise 
the enemy’s agents infiltrated, but also to provide to all workers (and residents) the 
sense of enemy maneuvers. That will make the action of the vigilantes, also the 
action of the masses and not only the one small group action. Even if the vigilantes’ 
action were more effective, it could not ever replace the collective action of the 
workers.299 
 
 
In order to follow the party-state orders many people were detected by the Vigilância 
Popular, as the image above illustrate. One famous example of this neutralisation is the arrest 
of João Cotoi in 1977, in Mapai. Cotoi was arrested by Vigilance group accused of being at 
service of the Rhodesian forces. According to the authorities, his role was to do 
reconnaissance trip, follow the way that ZANU soldiers and FPLM used in order to get to 
Rhodesia, at the same time that was trying to identify where the ZANU bases were installed 
and see the kind of weapons that they were using.300 
In fact, as the enforcement of the revolution and the aim of establishing the new order 
for the new society, Frelimo used the mechanism of punishment against all those who did not 
follow the rules. One of those punishments was to send people to re-education camps, which 
functioned as laboratories to transform all the Xiconhocas into New Men.301 The other radical 
punishment was the creation of the Tribunal Militar Revolucionário (Revolutionary Military 
Court) in March 1979. This court was created to judge the crimes against the security of 
people and the State.302 It was through this court that João Cotoi alongside with other 9 
people namely Gonçalves Carimo, Fernando Mutete, Manuel Jambo, Mamade Ussemane, 
Joel Tsimine, Calven Charekwa, Temoteo Tcherega and Rui Manuel da Silva were sentenced 
to the death penalty and executed in March 1979, accused of committing crimes against the 
people of Mozambique by being at service the Ian Smith regime.303 
One important aspect is that this politics of punishment had its roots in Frelimo’s 
liberation struggle, were soldiers used to face different kinds of punishment and disciplinary 
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measures such as extending hours in farming activities under rain and sun, cutting trees, 
digging holes, building shelters or even facing death penalty by firing squad.304 Alcidio 
Chivite, a Frelimo combatant who in 1970s, used to be responsible for supervising soldiers’ 
work in Frelimos’ farm (machambas) in Tete, explains one of the disciplinary methods that 
he used to apply to the reluctant soldiers: 
 
Most of soldiers were trying to avoid going to the machambas with the excuse of being sick. 
So, I used to punish them by asking a ‘sick’ person to sit into the tree trunk with both legs 
opened. Then, I used to tie his arms and legs into tree trunk and I ask a group of soldiers to 
carry him until the farm. Because of the walking movement, the tree trunk used to cripple the 
person and cause injury. So, after feeling the pain the person started to scream and confess 
that was not sick. After that, I would put him down and punish him with extra hours of 
working.305 
 
According to Urias Simango, who used to be Frelimo’s Vice-president, the acts of 
punishment of soldiers and population had been used in Frelimo war fronts, and had 
intensified by 1968, particularly in Cabo Delgado. These acts of punishment were exercised 
by the initiative of the military commanders without formal permission of the leaders.306 
When Samora Machel assumed Frelimo leadership in 1970, he started to use 
punishment as a ‘pedagogical tool’.307 The objective of those punishment measures was to re-
educate soldiers and transform them into correct men. An important aspect is that the 
punishment had to be employed in public, where everybody could see. That would make 
people feel fear of also being punished if they committed the same indiscipline.308 
Showing the image of Xiconhoca being assaulted by the population was also a way 
that the party-state used to intimidate and ideologically coerce people in order to support the 
Zimbabwean struggle as well as denounce all those who did not support the struggle. As 
Khanduri argues, cartoons have the power to evoke sense and sentiment of terror, horror and 
fear.309 So, to see Xiconhoca being assaulted and captured by the hand of population could 
make people feel a kind of fear of facing the same consequences as Xiconhoca.  
Thus, by using the image of Xiconhoca, Frelimo was doing what Allen Feldman 
considers as one of the issues that emerges from political violence and visibility, in which 
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‘the ideological imaginaries deploy rigid discriminatory and context, bound classification 
grids in language and discourse to create the politically visible and the politically unseen’.310 
 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
As soon as Mozambique became independent Frelimo used many mechanisms in order to 
ensure that the support that it was giving to Southern Africa’s liberation movements, 
particularly to Zimbabwean and South Africa liberation movements, was effective. One of 
those mechanisms was the use of the cartoon figure of Xiconhoca. 
In the process of supporting the Zimbabwean liberation movements and its struggle, 
Frelimo used the image of Xiconhoca to achieve three objectives. First of all, Frelimo wanted 
to ensure that everyone in Mozambique had access to the message of supporting the 
liberation struggle of Zimbabwe. In fact, in a country where most of people were not literate, 
Frelimo strategically used the combination of simple texts and visual images as a way to 
make the message of support easier and understandable to everyone, even to people who did 
not go to school. 
Secondly, Xiconhoca also had the role to intimate and stigmatise all those who did not 
support the liberation movements, using comic words and satire. To Frelimo, everyone who 
did not follow the ideals of revolution was against the process of building the new man. That 
means that they were traitors, instruments of the colonial regime, anti-revolutionaries, enemy 
agents, among other labels. All this revolutionary philosophy was embodied in one figure, the 
image of Xiconhoca, which could attract the viewers and influence their minds. In fact, no 
one wanted to look like the personification of the evil and ugly figure of Xiconhoca. Finally, 
Xiconhoca was also used as propaganda against the regime of Ian Smith in Rhodesia. This 
political propaganda through visual form had also the effect of acting as a way to persuade 
and influence people in a revolutionary context towards internationalism. 
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Conclusion  
The Independence of Mozambique was accompanied by intense celebration and euphoria. It 
was time to celebrate to all those who supported the liberation struggle against the 
Portuguese, but above all, time to support other liberation movements, particularly the 
Zimbabwean struggle. The idea of supporting the Zimbabwean liberation movement, ZANU, 
and its struggle came to Frelimo from its history of liberation struggle. In so doing, Frelimo 
was following the ideal of solidarity which ties together Southern African movements during 
their struggle against colonialism. So, it was expected by the party-state that all Mozambicans 
would commit to this cause. 
In the rural areas where Mozambican people had been sharing family ties and border 
with Zimbabwe, the interaction between Mozambican people and ZANLA militants as well 
as Zimbabwean refugees occurred naturally. People showed their moral duty in support to 
‘brothers from the other side’, helping them to transport material, giving them shelter and 
food, providing intelligence, and so on.  
However, in order to ensure that the support for Zimbabwean struggle was effective 
and involved all people from rural areas to the urban areas, the party-state started to create 
laws and measures to control this process. At the same time, the party-state created 
mechanisms to repress and punish all those who did not follow the rules. Frelimo’s idea of 
purification, of cleaning the new born nation from all viciousness brought from the colonial 
period, created a new identity of belonging. Indeed, it was expected that all people acted and 
behaved as a new morally correct new man, who follow the party-state ideas and polices. So, 
those who challenged the party-state’s objective and not followed the same ‘road’ and ideas 
were considered as enemies, traitors, Xiconhocas, and so on. 
One of the mechanisms that people found to show their belonging to the new nation 
was through cultural expression. The letters, poetry and songs that supported the 
Zimbabwean struggle bear a strong official influence on their creative process. By using a 
vocabulary of ready-made ideas, Mozambicans were making sure that the message of 
supporting Zimbabwe that was coming from above was clearly understood. It is therefore 
impossible to trace a pure social consciousness, because the line of separation between 
spontaneous support and the influence of political discourse cannot be clearly demarcated.  
The image of the cartoon figure of Xiconhoca had also an important role in this 
process. Xiconhoca was used to spread the message of support Zimbabwean Liberation 
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struggle, as well as to intimate, stigmatise and exert ideological coercion all those who were 
not supporting the struggle, the party-state. 
This dissertation brought on the table the nature and complexity of the relationship 
between Mozambican and Zimbabwean fighters, the kind of relationship that emerged from 
this contact, as well as the ways in which the Party-state had controlled all the process. 
However, further research is required to explore more in depth all this connections, as well as 
the military dynamic between Mozambican and ZANU soldiers, similarities and differences 
in tactic wars, as well as the difference of ideologies. The other important aspect to consider 
in further research is to role of women into the Milícias Populares. What was their role as 
Milícias Populares? How did they engage with men in this process? How the cultural 
manifestations at schools were important to instil and shape into the children the idea of 
solidarity with Zimbabwe? 
It will also be important to hear the voices of people from the other border areas that 
is, Manica, Tete and Sofala as well as the voice of the Zimbabweans who interacted with 
Mozambicans. Which kind of relationship they did they had with Zimbabwean fighters and 
refugees?  
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